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UNDRIP AND THE INTERVENTION:
INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION, PARTICIPATION, AND
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
Anna Cowan †
Abstract:
The adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”) by the General Assembly in 2007 was a landmark
achievement in the development of indigenous rights under international law, particularly
through its unequivocal recognition of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.
That same year, Australia launched a comprehensive Intervention into Aboriginal
communities in the Northern Territory, which purported to safeguard important human
rights but was heavily criticized for its discriminatory and non-consultative approach.
This article explores the meaning of self-determination under international law, now that
the long debate over whether indigenous peoples are “peoples” has finally been resolved.
It then uses the result of that analysis as the basis for a critique of Australia’s
methodology in the Intervention. The article argues that self-determination entails the
right of a people to control their own affairs through freedom from discrimination and
meaningful participation in decision-making, and that the scope of self-determination
must be the same for indigenous peoples as for ‘all peoples’ under international law.
When assessed against these criteria, it is clear that Australia’s Intervention methodology
fell well short of the requirements of empowerment inherent in these established and
evolving international human rights standards. As Australia moves beyond the
Intervention towards Stronger Futures it is imperative that the mistakes of an approach
based on discrimination and a failure to foster genuine participation by Aboriginal
peoples are not continued. The lessons of the Intervention are relevant for other states
beyond Australia as the international community moves to implement the standards in
UNDRIP.

I.

INTRODUCTION
Let us never forget this: . . . Australia’s treatment of her
aboriginal people will be the thing upon which the rest of the
world will judge Australia and Australians–not just now, but in
the greater perspective of history.1

†
LL.B (Hons) (Victoria Univ. of Wellington, NZ), BA (Victoria Univ. of Wellington, NZ), LL.M
(University of Cambridge, UK). Research Associate to Professor James Crawford SC, Lauterpacht Centre
for International Law, Cambridge, UK and formerly solicitor in the civil law section at the North Australian
Aboriginal Justice Agency, Darwin, Australia. Many thanks to Dr. Jessie Hohmann, Jonathon Hunyor and
Cecily Rose for their useful comments and advice. Any errors are my own. None of the views expressed
here purport to reflect the views of my current or previous employers.
1
Extract from 1972 speech by former Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, in E.G. WHITLAM,
ON AUSTRALIA’S CONSTITUTION 301 (1977). As the author does not identify as either Australian or
indigenous, the arguments in this article are presented from the perspective of an interested observer, in the
style of Ian Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 1-16
(James Crawford ed., 1988).
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Colonization, development, and modern “progress” have resulted in
widespread marginalization for indigenous peoples in Australia2 and around
the world.3 Virtually all indigenous peoples share common problems arising
from systematic and persistent human rights violations, with indigenous
status correlating closely with poverty.4
Against this background of disadvantage and oppression, the year
2007 saw the achievement of a “milestone of re-empowerment” 5 for
indigenous peoples. On September 13, 2007, the United Nations (“UN”)
General Assembly (“GA”) adopted the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”) by an overwhelming majority.6 It was the
culmination of an arduous drafting process that spanned more than two
decades, with unprecedented participation by indigenous representatives. 7
As a result, the final declaration is a compromise between state and
indigenous perspectives, rather than a purely state-driven instrument–
unusual in international law.8 Undoubtedly the most significant outcome is
that UNDRIP is the first international legal instrument expressly to
recognize that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. 9
2
See, e.g., Diane Otto, A Question of Law or Politics? Indigenous Claims to Sovereignty in
Australia, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 65 (1995); Peter Grose, Developments in the Recognition of
Indigenous Rights in Canada: Implications for Australia?, JAMES COOK U. L. REV. 68 (1997); Michael
Dodson & Lisa Strelein, Australia’s Nation-Building: Renegotiating the Relationship Between Indigenous
People and the State, 24 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 826 (2001); Julie Cassidy, The Legacy of Colonialism, 51
AM. J. COM. L. 409, 409 (2003); Deirdre Howard-Wagner, Restoring Social Order Through Tackling
‘Passive Welfare’: The Statutory Intent of the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007
(Cth) and Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) Act 2007 (Cth), 19
CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 243 (2007); Jennifer Martiniello, Howard’s New Tampa: Aboriginal
Children Overboard, 26 AUST. FEMINIST L.J. 123 (2007); Michael Murphy, Representing Indigenous SelfDetermination, 58(2) U. TORONTO L. J. 185 (2008); John Chesterman & Heather Douglas, Law on
Australia’s Northern Frontier: The Fall and Rise of Race, 24 CAN. J. L. & SOC'Y 69 (2009).
3
See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 74TH CONFERENCE (the Hague, 2010)
834-923 [hereinafter ILA REPORT].
4
See generally, Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global
Comparative and International Legal Perspective, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 98 (1999); Rodolfo
Stavenhagen, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Closing a Gap in Global Governance, 11 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 17 (2005); Asbjørn Eide, Rights of Indigenous Peoples–Achievements in International Law
During the Last Quarter of a Century, 37 NETHERLANDS Y.B. OF INT’L L. 155, 184 (2006). For further
discussion of “aboriginal syndrome,” see Cassidy, supra note 2.
5
Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1142 (2008).
6
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007). The vote breakdown for this resolution was 143 in
favor, 4 against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States), and 11 abstentions (Azerbaijan,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa, Ukraine).
7
See, e.g., ILA Report, supra note 3, at 836-40.
8
See, e.g., Maivân Lâm, Making Room for Peoples at the United Nations: Thoughts Provoked by
Indigenous Claims to Self-Determination, 25 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 603, 621 (1992); KAREN KNOP,
DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (2002).
9
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 3, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
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Although UNDRIP is not legally binding, this development provides
important legal recognition of a struggle for empowerment that had
previously been largely political in nature, 10 and offers an opportunity to
reconcile competing understandings of the content and scope of the right of
self-determination in international law.11
The first purpose of this paper is to take up that opportunity by
examining and defining the meaning of self-determination now that it has
been extended to indigenous peoples in UNDRIP. While there is vast
literature covering the development of the draft Declaration, and the
question of whether or not self-determination would ultimately be included
(and in what form), there has been comparatively little analysis of what selfdetermination actually means–for indigenous peoples specifically and for
“all peoples” more generally–now that it is unequivocally recognized in
UNDRIP.12 This article aims to contribute to the literature by arguing that
the meaning of self-determination following UNDRIP’s adoption is
consistent with traditional understandings of the right as recognized for “all
peoples,”13 not at odds with them. To clear away some of the controversy
around indigenous self-determination and facilitate its implementation on a
practical level, self-determination can be defined quite simply as a people’s
right to control its own affairs through freedom from discrimination and
meaningful participation in decision-making.
The second purpose of the article is to apply this interpretation to
important events unfolding in Australia. Specifically, the article uses these
evolving international standards of self-determination as the criteria for a
critical assessment of key aspects of the methodology used by the Australian
federal government in its intervention into Aboriginal communities in the
10
Chris Tennant, Indigenous Peoples, International Institutions, and the International Legal
Literature from 1945-1993, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 42-45 (1994).
11
Caroline Foster, Articulating Self-Determination in the Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 141 (2001).
12
Exceptions include various chapters in REFLECTIONS ON THE U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS ON
THE UNDRIP]; Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples in the Context of Human Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 141 (2011); Lorie Graham & Siegfried
Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty, Culture, and International Human Rights Law, 110 S. ATLANTIC Q. 403
(2011); Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Self-Determination, Culture, and Land: A Reassessment in Light of
the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF THE
UN DECLARATION 31, 44-7 (Elvira Pulitano ed., 2012).
13
See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. See also the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 20(1),
June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 363 (recognizing the “unquestionable and inalienable right to selfdetermination” of all peoples). The UN Charter refers to the “principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples” in arts. 1(2) and 55.
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Northern Territory of Australia (“NT”). Known as the NT National
Emergency Response (“NTER”) or simply “the Intervention,” this wideranging initiative was launched in 2007, the same year that UNDRIP was
adopted. The Intervention was triggered by the report of an inquiry into
child abuse in remote Aboriginal communities known as the Little Children
Are Sacred Report.14 The report documented the desperate living conditions
and general social breakdown that had precipitated the serious child abuse
problem, and predicted an impending disaster for Australia if urgent action
was not taken to address entrenched disadvantage in indigenous
communities in NT.15
In response, Australia implemented a complicated legislative package
introducing reforms that touched on almost all aspects of everyday life in the
communities affected. The federal government said the Intervention would
take important steps to protect children, to implement Australia’s obligations
under human rights treaties, and to advance the human rights of indigenous
peoples suffering the “crisis of community dysfunction.” 16 There is no
disputing that Australia was faced with an extremely serious and complex
situation, and that drastic action was urgently needed to protect the rights of
Aboriginal peoples, particularly children and women, in NT communities.
In that respect the Intervention represented an encouraging sign that the
federal government was willing to take these problems seriously and commit
significant resources to making improvements, to bring conditions in NT
into line with its obligations under international human rights law.
Unfortunately, Australia’s methodology and approach were seriously
flawed from a human rights perspective, and any initial optimism soon gave
way to intense criticism of the Intervention. The criticism centered on the
suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (“RDA”),17 and the fact
that the discriminatory measures were imposed wholly without consultation.
In other words, by UNDRIP standards, both the foundations for selfdetermination in the definition articulated above were absent.
14

REX WILD QC & PAT ANDERSON, REPORT OF THE NT BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE PROTECTION
OF ABORIGINAL CHILDREN FROM CHILD ABUSE, AMPE AKELYERNEMANE MEKE MEKARLE: LITTLE
CHILDREN ARE SACRED (2007), available at http://www.inquirysaac.nt.gov.au/pdf/bipacsa_final_report.pdf
[hereinafter LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED].
15
LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED, supra note 14, at 6.

16
Commonwealth Games Association (“CGA”), House of Representatives, Northern Territory
National Emergency Response Bill 2007 Explanatory Memorandum, 76, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/ntnerb2007541/ memo_0.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2011)
(hereinafter NTERB Explanatory Memorandum), 76.
17
Northern Territory Emergency Response Act 2007 [hereinafter NTERA] (Cth) s 132(2) (Austl.).
The Intervention also overrode contrary provisions of Northern Territory anti-discrimination laws. NTERA
s 133(2). This article solely considers the federal act.
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NTER was subsequently amended in an attempt to address these
concerns, 18 but many believe the redesign did not remedy the destructive
effects of the initial approach.19 Now, five years later, the life of NTER is
ostensibly over, as the key legislated areas were set to expire in August
2012.20 Australia has just passed new legislation to replace NTER,21 having
undertaken the Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory consultations in
June-August 2011.22 Accordingly, it is timely to step back and re-examine
why NTER approach was not the answer, in light of UNDRIP.
This is not simply a retrospective exercise in finger-pointing. The
new legislation has a life-span of 10 years, with the first independent review
scheduled for 3 years after commencement. 23 Significant resources have
been committed to its implementation by the federal and Northern Territory
(“NT”) governments, but serious concerns remain over the processes and
methods by which the legislation was developed and approved. As Australia
is on the threshold of the next phase of its campaign to improve living
conditions in NT communities, it is imperative that the methodological
mistakes of the Intervention are not repeated, and that UNDRIP is used as
guidance to ensure that the positive intentions behind the Intervention and
18

Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of Racial
Discrimination Act) Act 2010 (Cth) (Austl.) [hereinafter WWRDA].
19
See, e.g., Alison Vivian, NTER Redesign Consultation Process: Not Very Special, 14 AUSTRALIA
INDIGENOUS L. REV. 46 (2010); Alastair Nicholson et al., Will They Be Heard? A Response to NTER
Consultations: June to August 2009 (2009); Amnesty International, Submission No. 19 to Senate Standing
Committee on Community Affairs (Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/senate
/committee/clac_ctte/soc_sec_welfare_reform_racial_discrim_09/submissions/sub19.pdf; Rights and Equal
Opportunities Commission (HREOC), The Suspension and Reinstatement of the RDA and Special
Measures in NTER (2011), available at http://www.hreoc.gov. au/racial_discrimination/publications/rdanter/NTERandRDAPublication12%20December2011.pdf [hereinafter HREOC Report on RDA and Special
Measures].
20
In 2009 NTER transitioned to a “development” phase under the Closing the Gap in the Northern
Territory National Partnership Agreement. For an overview, see CGA, Closing the Gap: Prime Minister’s
Report
(2011),
available
at
http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/indigenous/pubs/closing_the_gap/
2011_ctg_pm_report/Documents/2011_ctg_pm_report.pdf [hereinafter Closing the Gap: Prime Minister’s
Report].
21
Three related bills were referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs on
November 25, 2011, and remained open for submissions until February 1, 2012: Stronger Futures in the
Northern Territory Bill 2011 (Cth) (Austl.); Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory (Consequential and
Transitional Provisions) Bill 2011 (Cth) (Austl.), and Social Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2011
(Cth) (Austl.). The Committee reported on March 14, 2012 and the bills were passed by the Senate at the
third reading in the early hours of June 29, 2012.
22
CGA, STRONGER FUTURES IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORY: DISCUSSION PAPER (June 2011),
available at http://www.indigenous.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/s_futures_discussion_paper.pdf;
CGA, STRONGER FUTURES IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORY: POLICY STATEMENT (November 2011),
available at http://www.indigenous.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Stronger_Futers_policy_statement
_nov2011.pdf [sic] [hereinafter CGA, STRONGER FUTURES POLICY STATEMENT]; CGA, STRONGER
FUTURES IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORY: REPORT ON CONSULTATIONS (Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.indigenous.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 10/consult_1710111.pdf.
23
See STRONGER FUTURES IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORY ACT 2012 (Cth), ss 117, 118 (Austl.).
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the Stronger Futures package can be built upon to maximum effect. There
are valuable lessons to be learned about the importance of fostering selfdetermination, of relevance not just to Australia, but in the context of
indigenous-state relations anywhere.
Section II sets up the criteria for assessing the Australian approach by
exploring the meaning of self-determination for indigenous peoples under
UNDRIP. It briefly considers different understandings of self-determination
before analyzing the content and scope of self-determination under
UNDRIP. It argues that the core normative foundations on which
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination depends are the same
foundations underpinning the right of self-determination long recognized for
“all peoples” under international law: the right to participation and the right
to be free from discrimination. Both are well-established rights in
themselves, but UNDRIP demands a higher standard of participation in
decision-making in the indigenous context, over and above the usual right to
political participation. The article argues that self-determination under
UNDRIP is equivalent in scope to “traditional” self-determination. It is
unacceptable and unnecessary to restrict it to a lesser form of selfdetermination than that recognized for “all peoples” under established
international law. Ultimately, the article argues that the right of selfdetermination can be defined as a people’s right to control its own affairs
through freedom from discrimination and meaningful participation in
decision-making.
Having articulated self-determination in this manner, the purpose of
Section III is to use those two fundamental components–non-discrimination
and participation–as the benchmark for assessing Australia’s approach in
NTER against established and evolving international standards. In doing so,
the article aims to set NTER within the framework of the wider international
human rights context, and to demonstrate why the Stronger Futures
legislation package and other initiatives must be implemented in alignment
with that context if they are to succeed.
Section III starts by introducing the Intervention and outlining the two
major themes of criticism that form the parameters of discussion, concluding
that the approach taken by the Australian government in NTER lacked both
of the normative foundations for self-determination set out in section II. It
then builds on this argument by examining each of those international legal
foundations in more detail, and applying them to the domestic NTER
context. First, the article looks at the right to non-discrimination, including
the role of special measures, and then it discusses the right to participation in
decision-making, elaborating on the important point that UNDRIP
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transcends established participatory rights. Judged against the criteria of
self-determination based on non-discrimination and participation in
decision-making, NTER assessment shows that in its choice of methods
Australia failed to live up to contemporary international standards of
engagement with its indigenous peoples, and was out of step with the
messages of empowerment and respect embodied in UNDRIP.
Section IV provides a preliminary assessment of the Stronger Futures
initiative against the same criteria, to see whether Australia has taken the
criticism of its NTER methodology on board. The end of the NTER period
provided an opportunity for a fresh start and a renewed commitment to
fostering genuine engagement. Early indications about the Stronger Futures
consultations gave some cause for cautious optimism about an improved
approach, but there is also troubling evidence suggesting little has changed.
While it is perhaps too early to be categorical in evaluating the methodology
used in the development and implementation of the new legislation, the
importance of not repeating the mistakes of NTER cannot be overstated.
Finally, Section V concludes by drawing together all of the strands of my
argument argument.
Before proceeding, it is worth pausing to clearly define the limits of
discussion. First, the author acknowledges that converting aspirations to
reality is easier said than done. This contribution is presented from an
academic international legal perspective, not from a practical domestic
policy perspective, and the emphases and observations will naturally reflect
that position. In particular, the article does not address the wider debates in
Australia or elsewhere about improving state-indigenous relations, or
attempt to provide all the answers to implementation of UNDRIP.
Nonetheless, it is hoped that critical scholarship and the articulation of a
simple working definition of self-determination based squarely on
established rights can make some contribution towards those goals.
Second, the application of international human rights criteria to assess
NTER is limited to the methods employed once Australia decided to act.
The author does not deny the very real need for action as a matter of
international human rights law, and does not privilege concerns about
process over the violations of other substantive rights that NTER purported
to address. The argument is that once Australia had decided to take action, it
should have maximized the opportunity for real change by doing things
properly, in line with established and evolving standards. Instead, there is
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evidence that the discriminatory and paternalistic approach taken was a large
factor in undermining NTER’s own effectiveness.24
Third, the article generally does not engage with the substance and
detail of the domestic legislation, except where it illuminates an argument
about Australia’s overall methodology and approach. This is partly because
the 500-page suite of NTER legislation (now replaced and supplemented by
some 300 pages of Stronger Futures legislation) is simply too
comprehensive in scope to cover each of the detailed reforms in any useful
way here. Primarily, however, it is because the focus is on evaluating the
methodology, from an international human rights perspective, rather than
assessing the ins and outs of individual policies and whether or not each one
might be effective. No doubt there have been provisions among the overall
package that do make welcome changes and have the support of Aboriginal
people in NT, but again, it cannot be argued that any such positive effects
have come about because Australia proceeded the way it did, or that a
discriminatory approach was necessary for those benefits to be realized.
II.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

A.

Self-Determination is the River in which All Other Rights Swim25

The adoption of UNDRIP by the GA in 2007 was described as a
“beacon of hope” for indigenous peoples around the world.26 Before 2007,
only two international legal instruments contained any specific recognition
of indigenous rights–International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions
10727 and 16928–and both demonstrate a markedly top-down, state-focused
perspective. 29 UNDRIP represents a significaSnt change of approach. It
24

National Territory Emergency Response (“NTER”) Review Board, REPORT OF THE NTER REVIEW
BOARD (Oct. 13, 2008), available at http://www.nterreview.gov.au/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2011) [hereinafter
REVIEW BOARD REPORT].
25
Craig Scott, Indigenous Self-Determination and Decolonization of the International Imagination:
A Plea, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 814, 814 (1996) (quoting Michael Dodson).
26
Russel Barsh, Indigenous Peoples and the UN Commission on Human Rights: A Case of the
Immovable Object and the Irresistible Force, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 782, 808 (1996) (quoting Erica-Irene Daes).
27
Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention 1957 (entered into force June 2, 1959).
28
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991).
29
For detailed discussion, see ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED NATIONS
STANDARDS: SELF-DETERMINATION, CULTURE AND LAND 49-101 (2007); Andrew Erueti, The International
Labour Organization and the Internationalisation of the Concept of Indigenous Peoples, in Allen &
Xanthaki eds., supra note 12, at 93-120. Convention 107 in particular was notoriously assimilationist. It
has largely been superseded by Convention 169, which was undoubtedly an improvement and has had
some impact beyond its limited membership (just 22 parties as of July 8, 2012), but it still retains a
decidedly state-driven flavor and does not enjoy widespread support from indigenous representatives. See
Tennant, supra note 10; Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Paper Presented at the Indigenous Peoples' Summit: The
Challenges of Implementing the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2008), available at
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does not create wholly new rights that do not exist in other instruments, but
pulls together pre-existing rights of general and specific application and
spells out how they relate to the specific conditions of indigenous peoples.30
As such, new applications of existing rights will emerge. It goes beyond
simply a synthesis of current practice,31 adding new nuances and advancing
indigenous rights with the inclusion of collective rights as well as individual
ones.32 Above all, UNDRIP treads new ground with its strong themes of
empowerment and partnership, departing from the traditional state-driven
approaches seen in the ILO Conventions.
Undoubtedly, UNDRIP’s most significant contribution to international
law is the unequivocal recognition in article 3 that indigenous peoples have
the right to self-determination.33 The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)
has described self-determination as the “need to pay regard to the freely
expressed will of peoples,” 34 but for decades there has been enormous
controversy over the meaning of “peoples.” 35 The language of UNDRIP
http://www.tebtebba.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=16&Itemid=27 (last visited
Apr. 1, 2011).
30
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Making the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Work: The
Challenge Ahead, in Allen & Xanthaki (eds.), supra note 12, at 147-70; Special Rapporteur, S. James
Anaya, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/9/ (Aug. 11, 2008)
[hereinafter “Anaya Report 2008”]. For discussion about the need for a special regime for indigenous
rights, beyond universal or minority rights, see, e.g., Xanthaki, supra note 29, at 133; Richard Falk, The
Rights of Peoples, in Brownlie, supra note 1, at 17-37; Cassidy, supra note 2; E. Cobb, Fifty Thousand
Years Old and Still Fighting For Rights: The Continuing Struggle of Australia's Indigenous Population, 38
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 375 (2010); Tauli-Corpuz, supra note 29; Mauro Barelli, The Role of Soft Law in
the International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
People, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 957 (2009). For the contrary view, see, e.g., Jeff Corntassel & Tomas
Primeau Hopkins, Indigenous ‘Sovereignty’ and International Law: Revised Strategies for Pursuing ‘SelfDetermination’, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 343 (1995).
31
Barsh, supra note 26, at 808 (quoting Daes); Helen Quane, The UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples: New Directions for Self-Determination and Participatory Rights?, in REFLECTIONS ON
THE UNDRIP, supra note 12, at 259-88.
32
XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 107-09; Barelli, supra note 30, at 963; Cindy Holder & Jeff
Corntassel, Indigenous Peoples and Multicultural Citizenship: Bridging Collective and Individual Rights,
24 HUM. RTS. Q. 126 (2002).
33
Indigenous peoples’ strong desire for recognition of their right to self-determination was both the
driving force behind the development of UNDRIP and the most controversial aspect of debate. See Lâm,
supra note 8, at 608; Erica-Irene Daes, An Overview of the History of Indigenous Peoples: SelfDetermination and the United Nations, 21 CAMBRIDGE REV. OF INT’L AFF. 7, 14 (2008); Eide, supra note
4; Xanthaki, supra note 29, at 110-12; Stavenhagen, supra note 4; S. James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner,
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Towards Re-empowerment, JURIST LEGAL NEWS
AND RESEARCH–FORUM, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/10/un-declaration-on-rights-ofindigenous.php, (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
34
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, para. 59 (Oct. 16) [hereineafter Western
Sahara].
35
See generally S. James Anaya, Contemporary Definition of the International Norm of SelfDetermination, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (1993) [hereinafter Anaya (1993)]; ROSALYN
HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT, 121-28 (1994); Wiessner,
supra note 4; S. James Anaya, Self-Determination as a Collective Human Right Under Contemporary
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expressly confirms for the first time that indigenous peoples are included
within the meaning of “all peoples” that are entitled to self-determination
under international law.
The purpose of this section is not to undertake a comprehensive
review of the right to self-determination under international law; nor of the
rights of indigenous peoples or minorities generally; nor of the unusual
development of UNDRIP itself. Each of these topics has been discussed
extensively in the literature.36 The objective here is to focus on the meaning
of self-determination now that UNDRIP has been adopted, drawing on
competing formulations and historical areas of contention and consensus
where they are useful. The aim is to offer a simple articulation of the right
to self-determination, derived from an examination of the background,
content, and context of UNDRIP. The simplicity of the definition advanced
is not intended to mask the complexity of this area of law, but to translate
self-determination into a form that is less abstract and less controversial, and
thus facilitates its practical implementation.
To provide some background to the indigenous self-determination
debate, the next section outlines briefly the competing understandings of
self-determination during UNDRIP’s drafting process.
A.

Competing Understandings of Self-Determination

For indigenous peoples, self-determination is the “mother of all
rights.” 37 It is seen as a necessary foundation for indigenous peoples’
enjoyment of all the other rights they claim,38 and the only solution to their
International Law, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION 318 (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000) [hereinafter Anaya (2000)]; Kristian Myntti, The Right of
Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination and Effective Participation, in Aikio & Scheinin (eds.) at 85-130.
36
See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 1; MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION (Christian Tomuschat
ed., 1993); Tennant, supra note 10; ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL
REAPPRAISAL (1995); Julian Burger, The United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 209 (1996); Aikio & Scheinin (eds.), supra note 35; KNOP, supra note 8;
PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2002); S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2004); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 108-28 (2d ed. 2006); Eide, supra note 4; XANTHAKI, supra note 29; UNIVERSAL
MINORITY RIGHTS (Marc Weller ed., 2007); Wiessner, supra notes 4; Weissner, supra note 5; Daes, supra
note 33; ILA REPORT, supra note 3, at 834-923.
37
S. James Anaya, Superpower Attitudes Towards Indigenous Peoples and Group Rights, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 251, 257 (1999)
38
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous
People, The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Australia, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/37/Add.4, para. 54 (Mar. 4,
2010) (by S. James Anaya) [hereinafter Anaya Report 2010]; HRC Res., General Comment No 12: Article
1 (The right to self- determination of peoples), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, 134 (1984); Lubicon Lake
Band v. Canada, HRC, U.N. Doc A/42/40, para. 13.3 (March 26, 1984); Special Rapporteur of the SubCommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study on the Problem of
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations: Final Report, Part III, U.N. Doc.
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problems: 39 for them, self-determination is the pillar on which UNDRIP
rests.40 Of course, the interests of indigenous peoples around the world are
not identical, and specific demands will be diverse, but generally there has
been remarkable consensus.41 The words most frequently used to translate
self-determination into indigenous languages reflect concepts of freedom,
integrity and respect. 42 In essence, the many aspirations and desires
expressed by indigenous peoples under the umbrella of self-determination43
can be summarized as “the right to be in control of their own destinies under
conditions of equality.”44
The persistent claims by indigenous peoples, framed in the language
of self-determination, have been met with sustained opposition from states.45
Traditionally, states have recognized self-determination as the right of
peoples under colonial, foreign, or alien occupation to independence.46 Selfdetermination has typically been seen as a right of whole populations, rather
than a right of subgroups within a state.47 The “specter of secession” looms
large: states fear that recognizing indigenous self-determination will
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8 para. 269 (Sept. 30, 1983) (by José Martínez-Cobo) [hereinafter MartínezCobo Report 1983].
39
Marjo Lindroth, Indigenous-State Relations in the UN: Establishing the Indigenous Forum, 42
POLAR RECORD 239, 244 (2006).
40
Catherine Brölmann & Marjoleine Zieck, Some Remarks on the Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 8 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 103, 104 (1995); United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/30, para. 27 (Aug. 17, 1994).
41
Grose, supra note 2, at 72.
42
Erica-Irene Daes, The Spirit and Letter of the Right to Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples:
Reflections on the Making of the United Nations Draft Declaration, in Aikio & Scheinin (eds.), supra note
35, at 67-83, 79.
43
See, e.g., Lindroth, supra note 39, at 244; Daes, supra note 33, at 17; ILA Report, supra note 3, at
846-50; Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 33.
44
Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm’n. H.R., Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 5 rev. 1, para. 64 (2002); Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v.
Belize, Case 12.053, INTER-AM. COMM’N. H.R., REPORT NO. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. para.
55 (2004).
45
For discussion of the major objections, see Patrick Thornberry, Self-Determination and Indigenous
Peoples, in Aikio & Scheinin (eds.), supra note 35, at 39-64, 47-57.
46
See, e.g., Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res.
1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR (Dec. 14, 1960) [hereinafter Colonial Declaration]; Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV),
(Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration]; Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 50/6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/6 (Nov. 9, 1995); Universal
Realization of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, G.A. Res. 58/161, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58.161
(March 2, 2004). See also Namibia, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21, 1971); Western Sahara,
supra note 34; Cassese, supra note 36; THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 36,
at 108-28.
47
See THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 36; Cassese, supra note 36, at
334-35; HIGGINS, supra note 35; compare Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, para. 124
(Can.).
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undermine their sovereignty and territorial integrity, leading to
fragmentation of the world order through the formation of new microstates.48
In traditional conceptions of self-determination, a distinction is often
made between so-called “internal” and “external” self-determination. 49
Internal self-determination, according to Daes, is “best viewed as entitling a
people to choose their political allegiances, to influence the political order in
which they live, and to preserve their cultural, ethnic, historical or territorial
identity.”50 Broadly speaking, this encompasses the majority of indigenous
claims to self-determination. External self-determination, by contrast, is
“the act by which a people determines its future international status and
liberates itself from ‘alien’ rules.”51 Many authors and states equate external
self-determination with the creation of an independent state.52
Given the semantic blockage that has resulted from different
interpretations of self-determination,53 some commentators have argued that
indigenous claims fall outside the meaning of self-determination in
international law.54 They argue that what indigenous peoples actually seek is
something different,55 and that they would do better to rely on other, more
relevant language in pursuing their cause.56 Others argue that indigenous
claims are not served by Western notions at all.57
These arguments ignore not only the immense political significance
that indigenous peoples attach (for better or worse) to their pursuit of selfdetermination, 58 but also the evolving nature of international legal
48

Wiessner, supra note 4, at 116. See General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Declaration Press Release].
49
See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 36, at 67-140; Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, General Recommendation No. XXI on the Right to Self-Determination, U.N. Doc. A/51/18
(1996); Myntti, supra note 35, at 103-09; Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 47, at para. 126.
50
Erica-Irene Daes, Explanatory Note Concerning the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26/Add. 1 (1993), para 19.
51
Id. at para 17.
52
See XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 146, 152; Anaya, supra note 37, at 258; Higgins, supra note 35,
at 124.
53
David Makinson, Rights of Peoples: A Logician's Point of View, in Brownlie, supra note 1, at 6992, 757.
54
See, e.g., Corntassel & Hopkins, supra note 30.
55
See, e.g., Falk, supra note 30.
56
See, e.g., Corntassel & Hopkins, supra note 30; Kyla Reid, Against the Right to SelfDetermination (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1905257, (last visited Oct. 13, 2011) (Working
Paper).
57
Gary Johns, The Poverty of Self-Determination, in WAKING UP TO DREAMTIME: THE ILLUSION OF
ABORIGINAL SELF-DETERMINATION 15-34; Trevor Satour, The New Authoritarian Separatism, in WAKING
UP TO DREAMTIME: THE ILLUSION OF ABORIGINAL SELF-DETERMINATION 35-57 (G. Johns ed., 2007); Otto,
supra note 2.
58
Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 33.
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concepts, 59 and the importance of equality. 60 The better view is that the
widespread fear among states of indigenous secession is unreasonable and
overstated.61 It should not prevent development of all peoples’ recognized
right to self-determination,62 now that its existence for indigenous peoples is
beyond doubt. This argument is based on a consideration of UNDRIP itself
within the context of established international law.
B.

The Meaning of Self-Determination Under UNDRIP

Self-determination is not defined in UNDRIP. In summary, this
Section argues that the content of self-determination under UNDRIP can be
distilled to two essential prerequisites: meaningful participation in decisionmaking, and freedom from discrimination. These foundations are tied
together by the overriding element of empowerment that permeates the text,
to give a definition of self-determination that amounts to the right of
indigenous peoples to control their own affairs. As such, self-determination
under UNDRIP reflects pre-existing human rights, but it adds an extra
element of normative content that has previously been lacking for
indigenous peoples. It is not a completely new right63 or even a radical reinterpretation of self-determination as traditionally understood, 64 but a
natural evolution that is consistent with existing international law. 65
Interpreted this way, it becomes clear that self-determination must not be
treated as synonymous with secession in all cases, and that the scope of selfdetermination in the indigenous context must be read as equal to its scope
for all other peoples. The next Sections address, in turn, the content and
scope of the right to self-determination under UNDRIP.
1.

Content of the Right to Self-Determination Under UNDRIP

The right to self-determination in Article 3 of UNDRIP is framed
almost identically to common Article 1 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) and the International
59

See XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 149-51; HIGGINS, supra note 35; Benedict Kingsbury,
Reconstructing Self-Determination: A Relational Approach, in Aikio & Scheinin (eds.), supra note 35, at
19-37.
60
Otto, supra note 2, at 92; Barsh, supra note 26; XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 131-32.
61
Anaya, supra note 37; Scott, supra note 25. This worry on the part of states has been described as
“something of a red herring” by Julian Burger, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
From Advocacy to Implementation, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UNDRIP, supra note 12, at 41-59, 45.
62
See generally Cassese, supra note 36, at 348-51.
63
Compare statements by Ecuador and the UK cited in Quane, supra note 31 (Ecuador and UK
claim this is an entirely new right).
64
Makinson, supra note 53, at 75.
65
ANAYA REPORT 2008, supra note 30; XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 131-76; Barelli, supra note 30.
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which in turn came from
General Resolution 1541 (XV) of 1960, the “Colonial Declaration:”
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.66
Article 4 of UNDRIP goes on to provide that:
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to selfdetermination, have the right to autonomy or self-government
in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as
ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.
It is explicit in these provisions that the right to self-determination entails an
element of political freedom, as well as the free pursuit of economic, social,
and cultural development, and that its exercise may be closely linked to
autonomy or self-government.
Before analyzing what is included within the meaning of selfdetermination, it is important to set the parameters of what must be left out.
During the drafting process there was a tendency for indigenous
representatives to treat self-determination as an expansive catch-all right,67
and some saw all of UNDRIP’s provisions as part of self-determination.68
Many indigenous claimants see their rights to lands and natural resources,
and respect for cultural integrity, as integral aspects of self-determination.69
There is no denying that the exercise of self-determination may be
linked to these other important rights, 70 but subsuming them into the
definition of self-determination itself is not the answer. Expanding the
meaning of self-determination to cover everything dilutes its power,71 while
66

In the ICCPR, ICESCR, and the Colonial Declaration, “indigenous” is replaced by “all”.
XANTHAKI, supra note 29.
Foster, supra note 11, at 150.
69
See, e.g., Dann v. United States, supra note 44; John Henriksen, The Right of Self-Determination:
Indigenous Peoples versus States, in Aikio & Scheinin (eds.), supra note 35, at 131-41, 136; Ted Moses,
The Right of Self-Determination and its Significance to the Survival of Indigenous Peoples, in Aikio &
Scheinin (eds.), supra note 35, at 155-177, 162; Quane, supra note 31, at 262.
70
ICCPR Common Article 1(2); ICESCR common art. 1(2); UNDRIP, art. 3; Mahuika et al. v. New
Zealand, HRC, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993, para. 9.2 (Nov. 16, 2000); Lubicon Lake Band v.
Canada, supra note 38 at para. 13.4; Human Rights Council, General Comment No. 12, supra note 38;
Diergaardt v Namibia, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/760/1996 (2000), para. 10.3;
Daes, supra note 33, at 8; United Nations Permanent Forum on Indegnous Issues (“NPFII”), State of the
World’s Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/328 16 (2009); Alison Vivian, Some Human Rights Are
Worth More Than Others: The Northern Territory Intervention and the Alice Springs Town Camps, 35 ALT.
L.J. 13 (2010).
71
Corntassel & Hopkins, supra note 30, at 361; XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 152.
67
68
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simultaneously draining power from other rights that are separately
recognized as worthy of protection in themselves.72 While it may be that the
principle of self-determination is capable of encapsulating all these
aspirations, the right as it has been recognized in UNDRIP will necessarily
be more tightly confined.73
Alexandra Xanthaki advocates striking a balance between a
maximalist approach to self-determination, which sees it as “all things to all
men,”74 and a minimalist one, which prevents its development beyond the
contexts in which it has traditionally been recognized.75 She suggests that
cultural and socio-economic rights should be considered separately from
self-determination. 76 This view is shared by Higgins 77 and the United
Nations Human Rights Committee (“HRC”).78
Besides cultural and socio-economic rights, there has also been
extensive discussion about autonomy and self-government in the context of
indigenous self-determination.79 Some commentators have argued that they
are essential components of the right,80 or even that the indigenous goal of
self-determination is autonomy and self-government.81
However, the President of the ICJ, in his concurring declaration in the
Namibia case, made the point that being restricted to internal autonomy and
local self-government is effectively a denial of self-determination as it is
envisaged in the Charter.82 In other words, autonomy and self-government
do not amount to self-determination. Nor are they simply component parts
of self-determination: the structure of Articles 3 and 4 reveals that autonomy
and self-government are separate rights in and of themselves, which may be
72

XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 154.
Self-determination exists as political principle, legal principle, and legal right. See, e.g., Crawford,
supra note 36, at 108-28; XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 143, 155-57; KNOP, supra note 8, at 29-49. The
shift from “principle” to “right” first appeared in 1960. Colonial Declaration, supra note 46. See HIGGINS,
supra note 35, at 114.
74
HIGGINS, supra note 35, at 128.
75
XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 146-54.
76
Id. at 154.
77
HIGGINS, supra note 35, at 125.
78
See Human Rights Committee (“HRC”), General Comment No. 23: Article 27 (The rights of
minorities), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, 158 (May 12, 1994) (distinguishing Articles 1 and 27 of the
ICCPR, although it should be noted that the HRC acknowledged in Mahuika v. New Zealand, supra note
70, that Article 1 helps inform article 27.)
79
See, e.g., ILA Report, supra note 3, at 850-57; Foster, supra note 11; Benedict Kingsbury, Claims
By Non-State Groups, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 481, 487 (1992); Kingsbury, supra note 59, at 26-31;
Henriksen, supra note 69; Myntti, supra note 35, at 114-122; Stefania Errico, The Draft UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Overview, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 741-55 (2007).
80
Tennant, supra note 10.
81
Federico Lenzerini, Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel Sovereignty of
Indigenous Peoples, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 155, 173 (2007).
82
Namibia, supra note 46, para. 63 (President Zafrulla Khan).
73
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possible expressions of the indigenous right to self-determination. 83
Similarly, under Article 3, the free determination of political status and free
pursuit of development are consequences of having the right to selfdetermination, rather than components of the right itself.
The key to defining self-determination is not to incorporate the
specific substantive content of all other rights related to its exercise, but to
distil the overarching right to its normative essence. It needs to be expressed
in a form that is flexible enough to encompass and facilitate the exercise of
those other rights, without diminishing their power as separate rights
existing in and of themselves, and without becoming so general as to be
meaningless.
The essence of self-determination in UNDRIP is the thread of
empowerment running through Articles 3 and 4: the “power to have
power;”84 the freedom to choose. This focus is consistent with the emphasis
on the peoples’ free choice as a foundation of self-determination as it has
traditionally been understood.85
Practically speaking, this empowerment in UNDRIP translates to an
enhanced freedom to participate in decision-making. UNDRIP emphasizes
the need for political participation, and the importance of indigenous
peoples’ freedom to choose what form their political participation will
take. 86 Indigenous peoples can participate in the same systems and
institutions as the rest of their state, or use their own institutions, or combine
the two options. That right to choose is a vital expression of empowerment
in itself. Under traditional international law, political participation as a
prerequisite for self-determination is reflected in the concept of
representative government upheld in General Resolution 2625 of 1970, the
Friendly Relations Declaration.87
A significant development throughout UNDRIP, however, is the
widespread use of related terms including “free, prior and informed
consent,” “consultation and cooperation,” “partnership” and “active
involvement.” 88 This pattern extends participation beyond the political
sphere, providing for close involvement in decision-making across all areas
83
Autonomy and self-government have not previously been recognized as distinct rights in
international law, although elements of these concepts feature in ILO Convention 169 without express
reference to self-determination. See Kingsbury, supra note 59, at 26; Myntti, supra note 35, at 114-22;
Errico, supra note 79, at 749-50.
84
Otto, supra note 2, at 75.
85
Western Sahara, supra note 34; HIGGINS, supra note 35; Cassese, supra note 36, 334.
86
See UNIDRIP arts. 5, 18 and 19.
87
See infra, text accompanying note 109.
88
See, e.g., UNDRIP, preamble, para. 15, 19, 24; Id. arts. 5, 10-12, 15, 17-19, 22, 23, 25, 27-30, 32,
36, 38, 41.
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of engagement between states and indigenous peoples. This extra
dimension, described as “genuinely groundbreaking,”89 provides the added
level of empowerment that will facilitate the free pursuit of development
contemplated in article 3. The significance of the enhanced participatory
rights is illustrated further below, when it comes to assessing NTER against
the standards of self-determination in UNDRIP.
Also integral to the interpretation of UNDRIP are the prominent
themes of equality and non-discrimination woven through the text. 90
Articles 1, 2, and 9 are particularly important in this regard, emphasizing
that indigenous peoples, collectively and as individuals, have the right to full
enjoyment of all human rights, free from discrimination of any kind. 91
Discrimination against indigenous peoples would undermine UNDRIP
altogether; the rest of the rights it contains, including self-determination and
participation, can have little meaning while discrimination persists. The
earlier emphasis on non-discrimination through assimilation into the
dominant culture, for which ILO Convention 107 was strongly criticized,92
has shifted to a recognition of equality that respects the value of diversity
and difference and underpins the enjoyment of all other rights in UNDRIP.
Participation in decision-making and freedom from discrimination are
essential prerequisites for indigenous empowerment; together, these
ingredients form the content of self-determination under UNDRIP. The
practical application of the right, thus defined, can be tailored to fit the
specific circumstances of different indigenous peoples around the world.
This interpretation is consistent with the views of various states expressed
during the drafting process, including Australia.93
89
90
91

Quane, supra note 31, at 273.
See, e.g., UNDRIP preamble arts. 2, 4, 5, 9, 18, 22, arts. 1, 2, 9, 14-17, 21, 22, 24, 29, 44, 46.
UNDRIP art. 1 provides:
Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals,
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights law.”
Art. 2 provides: “Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other
peoples and individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in
the exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity.

Art. 9 provides: “Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous
community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation
concerned. No discrimination of any kind may arise from the exercise of such a right.”
92
See XANTHAKI, supra note 29, 49-101; Erueti, supra note 29, at 93-120; Tauli-Corpuz, supra, note
29; Tennant, supra note 10; see also Falk, supra note 30, at 32-33; Barelli, supra note 30, at 958.
93
See Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Open-Ended Intersessional
Working Group on a Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2/Add.2 para. 8 (Nov. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Working Group Draft Declaration].
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Scope of the Right to Self-Determination under UNDRIP

On the whole, the rights contained in UNDRIP are generally described
as means of exercising internal self-determination.94 What is not explicitly
resolved in UNDRIP is the burning question of whether it also recognizes
external self-determination. Article 46(1) provides that UNDRIP does not
imply a right to contravene the UN Charter, or authorize or encourage any
action that would “dismember or impair . . . the territorial integrity or
political unity of sovereign and independent States.95 Certain commentators
argue that the inclusion of this provision at a very late stage of negotiations
implicitly ruled out any possibility of indigenous secession.96 Several states,
including Australia, seem to share this view.97
This argument merits close scrutiny. According to Daes, states
intended that UNDRIP would only allow for internal elements of the right.98
But reading Article 46(1) as categorically excluding the possibility of
external self-determination inevitably leads to the conclusion that the right to
self-determination is different in scope for indigenous peoples, as compared
to all other peoples. The intention of states during drafting may be one
consideration to take into account, but UNDRIP now stands as an adopted
text and it is open to alternative interpretations. Let it be clear that the
author expresses no opinion on the merits or otherwise of indigenous
secession as such; rather, the argument to follow pursues an important point
about equality–one of the cornerstones of UNDRIP. The scope of selfdetermination for indigenous peoples under UNDRIP must equal the scope
of the right for all peoples. Closer analysis of the text itself and of the
international legal context reveals why the conclusion that UNDRIP
categorically excludes indigenous secession is not only unacceptable, but
also unnecessary.

94
95

See e.g., Eide, supra note 4; Daes, supra note 33.
The full text of UNDRIP art. 46(1) reads:
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group
or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter
of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent States.

96

See, e.g., Eide, supra note 4, at 211; Quane, supra note 31; Engle, supra note 12.
Jenny Macklin MP, Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs
(FAHCSIA), Statement on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Apr. 3,
2009), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/Australia_official_statement_endorsem
ent_UNDRIP.pdf; Declaration Press Release, supra note 48.
98
Daes, supra note 33; see also Foster, supra note 11, at 152-53.
97
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There are no established rules for the interpretation of GA
resolutions, 99 but by analogy, the customary rules of treaty interpretation
enshrined in Articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
may provide useful guidance. 100 The basic rule is that a text should be
interpreted in good faith according to the ordinary meaning of its terms in
their context, in light of the instrument’s object and purpose.101 Recourse to
supplementary means of interpretation such as the travaux préparatoires is
generally only indicated if it is necessary to confirm the meaning resulting
from the basic rule, or to determine the meaning if the application of that
basic rule leads to an interpretation which is ambiguous or obscure, or
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.102
If UNDRIP is to be applied in good faith, then it is imperative that any
interpretation of UNDRIP treat the right of indigenous peoples to selfdetermination as equal to the right afforded to “all peoples.”103 Looking at
the ordinary meaning of the language used, none of the provisions in
UNDRIP expressly exclude external self-determination, in any form. Article
3 merely refers to “self-determination” in unqualified form, using identical
language to common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR. Article 46(1)
contains no explicit reference to self-determination nor to Article 3, but
simply echoes the long-established position on self-determination under
general international law.104
As for the context, the view that self-determination in UNDRIP is the
same as that recognized for “all peoples” is supported by Article 46(2),
which provides that any limitations on the rights in UNDRIP are to be nondiscriminatory, and preambular paragraph 16, which affirms the fundamental
importance of the right of all peoples to self-determination under the major
international instruments. Further, preambular paragraph 17 states “nothing
in UNDRIP may be used to deny any peoples their right to self99
But see generally C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 61-65 (2d ed. 2005); CARLOS FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANI, SOVEREIGNTY AND
INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS (2007).
100
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
For a discussion of the interpretation of Security Council resolutions which likewise uses the treaty
interpretation principles as a starting point, and addresses the limitations of such an approach, see Michael
Wood, The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, 2 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 73
(1998).
101
VCLT, supra note 100, at art. 31.
102
VCLT, supra note 100, at art. 32.
103
ILA REPORT, supra note 3, 850; Daes, supra note 50, para. 28; Lâm, supra note 8; Kingsbury,
supra note 59, at 22-23; Otto, supra note 2.
104
E.g. Colonial Declaration, supra note 46; Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 46. The
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation Europe (Aug. 1, 1975) 14 ILM 1292 [hereinafter
Helsinki Final Act]; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (June 25,
1993). See Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 47 at para. 130.
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determination exercised in conformity with international law.” This is also
an indication of UNDRIP’s object and purpose.
Although states might argue that the object and purpose of inserting
Article 46(1) was to exclude any possibility of indigenous secession as a
means of self-determination, there is a counter-argument that such an
interpretation violates the fundamental principle of good faith, 105 besides
contradicting the ordinary meaning of the words on their face. It cannot be
correct that the very instrument that recognizes indigenous peoples’ right to
self-determination simultaneously denies it, by removing the peoples’ right
to choose and restricting it to purely internal means of self-determination.106
To read the same words as meaning something less in the case of indigenous
peoples than they mean for all other peoples, without an express exclusion in
the text, undermines the spirit of equality and non-discrimination that is the
backbone of the text and one of the most important objects of the
declaration. Rather, UNDRIP must be read as granting indigenous peoples
access to the same rights and remedies available to “all peoples”–subject, of
course, to the same legal limitations that apply to all peoples.
This crucial qualifier leads into the argument that a restrictive reading
of UNDRIP is unnecessary. International instruments must be interpreted
and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the
time of interpretation,107 particularly jus cogens. The international law of
self-determination outside the indigenous context has developed in such a
way that it is clear the right operates subject to the overriding protection
granted to the territorial integrity of “parent” states. 108 The Friendly
Relations Declaration protects the territorial integrity and political unity of:
sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples and thus possessed of a government

105
Admittedly, UNDRIP is not a treaty and indigenous peoples are not “parties” to it in any sense,
but nonetheless, the ICJ has held that the customary law principle of good faith is “[o]ne of the basic
principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source”. Nuclear
Tests (Australia v. France) 1974 I.C.J. 268, para. 46 (Dec. 20) and Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France)
1974 I.C.J. 473, para. 49 (Dec. 20). Perhaps states are not yet under a strict obligation to recognize
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, but it seems likely that the customary status of that right
will develop over time, in line with the customary obligation on states to protect “all peoples” right to selfdetermination.
106
See supra, text accompanying note 82.
107
Namibia, supra note 46, at para. 53.
108
See Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 47, at para. 131; Barsh, supra note 26; LarsAnders Baer, The Right of Self-Determination and the Case of the Sami, in Aikio & Scheinin (eds.), supra
note 35, 223-231, 230.
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representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or colour.109
There is no reason why this protection would not cover selfdetermination by indigenous peoples. Simply having the status of a
“people” does not automatically entail a general right to unilateral secession
under international law.110 There are only limited cases where the exercise
of self-determination through secession is undisputedly legitimate: where a
people seek independence from colonial, foreign or alien domination.111
In all other cases, state boundaries are protected, provided the state
possesses a representative government–that is, one whose policies “reflect
the nature and interests of both the population of the state as a whole and of
the peoples who are part of the population”. 112 Thus, representative
government requires avenues for participation in decision-making without
discrimination.
The wording of the Friendly Relations Declaration
encapsulates the same relationship between participation and equality that
was identified above as providing the foundation for self-determination
under UNDRIP.
In other words, self-determination under UNDRIP derives from and is
consistent with existing law on self-determination. That does not mean the
right of self-determination is exactly identical in nature for all peoples in all
cases–self-determination manifests in different forms, depending on the
circumstances113–but it supports the argument that all peoples are entitled to
equivalent recognition of the right.114
Another important consideration is that self-determination is not a
static right, but a continual process.115 If the meaningful exercise of internal
self-determination becomes impossible because the state is breaching
fundamental rights and is not truly representative, there is some suggestion
that in exceptional circumstances a limited option of remedial secession
might arise, as a last resort when all other means of peaceful remedy have
109

In the Vienna Declaration the words “as to race, creed or colour” were replaced by “of any kind.”
See Daes, supra note 33, at 7.
111
See, e.g., Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 47, at para. 131; Cassese, supra note 36, at
334; Colonial Declaration, supra note 46; Namibia, supra note 46; Friendly Relations Declaration, supra
note 46.
112
Foster, supra note 11, at 143; compare HIGGINS, supra note 35, at 124. See also Myntti, supra
note 35, at 97.
113
See Frederic Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 AM. J.
INT’L L. 304 (1994); Brownlie, supra note 1; Kingsbury, supra note 79, at 498.
114
If the right for indigenous peoples is different, it must only be more favorable, not less, in
recognition of indigenous peoples’ particular disadvantage. ILA REPORT, supra note 3, at 850. See also
Graham & Wiessner, supra note 12, at 413-14.
115
See Helsinki Final Act, supra note 104; HIGGINS, supra note 35, at 115, 119; Kingsbury, supra
note 59; Thornberry, supra note 45, at 51; Daes, supra note 42, at 79; XANTHAKI, supra note 29.
110
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failed.116 The argument for remedial secession is based on the notion that
without truly representative government, the right to self-determination is
frustrated in just the same manner as it is under colonial or alien domination,
the traditional grounds for exercising self-determination.117
Looking at this argument from a different angle, Anaya advocates a
conceptual shift away from the usual division between internal and external
self-determination, to focus instead on substance and remedy. 118 On this
view, substantive self-determination comprises those elements that are
reflected in UNDRIP and generally accepted as expressions of internal selfdetermination. 119 Only when the government fails to make the ongoing
exercise of self-determination possible within the state does the question of a
remedy for the violation of the norm arise. Secession is just one example of
a remedy;120 the choice of remedy will be influenced by the context of the
violation. In this regard, substantive self-determination applies broadly to
benefit all segments of humanity, but remedial self-determination is
necessarily narrower in application.121
Anaya’s distinction is persuasive and illuminating.
On this
understanding, the entrenched assumption that self-determination means
secession and is wedded to entitlements or attributes of statehood is exposed
as unnecessary, confusing remedy with substance.122 The professed fear of
states is disproportionate to the actual threat to their sovereignty. No people,
indigenous or otherwise, could legitimately achieve secession in a manner
that would contravene international law; Article 46(1) of UNDRIP merely
reiterates the established position.
Another important point, of course, is that indigenous claims are
virtually never expressed as a desire for secession.123 Simply asserting the
right to self-determination does not mean sovereign independence would
always be preferred. 124 The goal is almost always self-determination
116
See Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 47; Katangese People’s Congress v Zaire, Afr.
Comm’n. H.P.R., Comm. No. 75/92, para. 6 (1995); Loizidou v Turkey (Merits), 108 Eur. Ct. H.R. 443,
471 (per Judge Wildhaber, joined by Judge Ryssdal) (1996). See also XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 142-43.
117
Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 47, at 135; see also Lenzerini, supra note 81, at 174;
XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 136.
118
Anaya (1993), supra note 35; Anaya (2000), supra note 35.
119
Anaya divides the substance into constitutive and ongoing self-determination; this article is only
concerned with ongoing self-determination. See Anaya supra note 35, (1993) at 145; Anaya (2000) at 9-12.
120
Other options are established in, for example, G.A. Res. 1541 (1960) and the Friendly Relations
Declaration, supra note 46.
121
ANAYA (2000), supra note 35, at 13.
122
See Kingsbury, supra note 79, at 502; ANAYA (2000), supra note 35, at 12; XANTHAKI, supra note
29, at 152; Cassese, supra note 36, at 348-51.
123
See Daes, supra note 33; Thornberry, supra note 45, at 53; Quane, supra note 31, at 266; Eide,
supra note 4, at 172.
124
Otto, supra note 2, at 72; Kingsbury, supra note 79, at 498; HIGGINS, supra note 35, at 25.
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alongside the other peoples sharing the same state: interdependence rather
than independence.125
Nonetheless, indigenous peoples are justified in insisting that the right
to self-determination in UNDRIP should not be read down as a lesser form
of the right accorded to all other peoples. The better interpretation is that
indigenous self-determination is consistent with established international
norms and equivalent to “traditional” self-determination in scope. It is
capable of encapsulating indigenous peoples’ own expressions of selfdetermination and recognizing their fundamental right to equality, without
any increased threat to the principles of state sovereignty and territorial
integrity. The common but misguided assumption that the term “selfdetermination” is interchangeable with the term “secession” should not be
allowed to stand in the way of development of indigenous self-determination
in parallel with the right to self-determination of all peoples. States that are
genuinely willing to engage with indigenous peoples in the spirit of
UNDRIP have nothing to fear from its recognition of self-determination.
C.

Self-determination as Empowerment, through Freedom from
Discrimination and Participation in Decision-Making

Based on the preceding consideration of the background of selfdetermination under international law, and analysis of the content and scope
of the right as expressed in UNDRIP, it is possible to articulate a definition
of the right as it should apply in the indigenous context. The vexed question
of whether indigenous peoples are “peoples” has been resolved by Article 3
of UNDRIP, which provides indigenous peoples with the same unqualified
right to self-determination recognized for “all peoples” under international
law. Although UNDRIP itself is not a source of binding legal obligations, 126
some commentators assert that the right to self-determination of indigenous

125

Tennant, supra note 10; Corntassel & Hopkins, supra note 30; Murphy, supra note 2; Kingsbury,
supra note 59, at 24; W. Sanders, “Towards an Indigenous Order of Australian Government: Rethinking
Self-determination as Indigenous Affairs Policy,” Discussion Paper 230 (Centre for Aboriginal Economic
Policy Research, Australian National University, 2002).
126
The provisions of G.A. resolutions amount to recommendations, rather than obligations. See U.N.
Charter arts. 10-14. States used this proposition to argue both for increasing and reducing protections while
drafting UNDRIP. See Barsh, supra note 26, 789. As a declaration, UNDRIP will carry higher
expectations toward compliance than an ordinary resolution. ILA REPORT, supra note 3, at 840-41; Anaya
REPORT 2008, supra note 30; Barelli, supra note 30. However, many states have made a point of observing
that it is an aspirational document, not a legal one, and compliance with its standards is not obligatory. See,
e.g., General Assembly meeting record, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 (Sept. 13, 2007); Declaration Press
Release, supra note 48. For more nuanced discussion on the status of G.A. resolutions, see Namibia, supra
note 46, at para. 50; HIGGINS, supra note 35, at 22-28; FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANI, supra note
99, at 65 et seq.
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peoples enjoys customary status, 127 equivalent to the settled status of the
general right of peoples to self-determination as a right erga omnes under
customary international law.128 Unfortunately, however, this assertion is not
(yet) supported by the requisite elements of opinio juris 129 and state
practice.130 The better view is that it is premature to assert that the right to
self-determination of indigenous peoples has crystallized as a customary
norm at this point in time.131 Nonetheless, UNDRIP’s adoption represents a
significant step forward at the international level, and it will increase in
status and relevance over time.
Analysis of the text reveals that the right to self-determination in
UNDRIP amounts to the empowerment of a people to control its own affairs,
founded on two essential rights: the right to be free from discrimination, and
the right to meaningful participation in decision-making. This analysis is
important for three reasons. First, interpreting indigenous self-determination
as founded on these two basic rights strips it of some of its controversy, by
shifting the focus towards implementation of those rights as necessary
prerequisites for substantive self-determination, instead of unnecessarily
contentious issues around external self-determination. In other words, selfdetermination does not just mean secession.
127

See, e.g., ILA REPORT, supra note 3, at 909-10; Eide, supra note 4, at 157; Wiessner, supra notes
4 and 5; Lenzerini, supra note 81, at 187; Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 33.
128
East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 29 (1995); Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, para. 88
(2004).
129
The process for including self-determination in UNDRIP was so fraught and controversial that it is
doubtful the level of opinio juris meets the requisite standard: four states with significant indigenous
populations voted against the adoption of UNDRIP, and many states who supported it expressly stated that
they did not believe themselves to be bound by its provisions. See General Assembly meeting record,
supra note 126; Declaration Press Release, supra note 48. Compare Lenzerini, supra note 81 and Anaya &
Wiessner, supra note 33, who argue that this does not undermine opinio juris.
130
The reality of life for indigenous peoples worldwide is generally far removed from any notion of
self-determination on a factual level. See MARTÍNEZ-COBO REPORT 1983, supra note 38; Cassidy, supra
note 2; ANAYA REPORT 2008, supra note 30. Numerous indigenous complaints brought before the HRC
and regional human rights systems confirm that there are widespread problems with state practice regarding
key indigenous issues, including control of traditional lands and natural resources, equality of rights, and
political participation. See, e.g., Endorois v. Kenya, African Comm’n H.P.R, Com. No. 276/2003 (2009);
Maya (Toledo) v. Belize, supra note 44; Dann v. United States, supra note 44; Lubicon Lake Band v.
Canada, supra note 38; Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. C/172 (Nov. 28,
2007); Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., No. C/79 (Aug. 31, 2001); Yakye Axa v. Paraguay,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., No. C/125 (June 17, 2005); YATAMA v. Nicaragua, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 127, para. 214-220 (June 23, 2005); Moiwana v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124
(Feb. 8, 2006); Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006).
131
XANTHAKI, supra note 29; Quane, supra note 31, at 261. This conclusion does not preclude the
right from acquiring that status in time, of course; on the contrary, it will be necessary for that to happen if
the indigenous right to self-determination is to become truly equal to the right of “all peoples”, as this
article argues it must.
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Second, by recognizing that the fundamental relationship between
participation, non-discrimination and self-determination under UNDRIP is
consistent with established law deriving from the UN Charter and the
Friendly Relations Declaration, it implies that indigenous and “traditional”
self-determination need not and should not be perceived as different
rights.132 The argument is not that self-determination for indigenous peoples
is exactly identical in nature to self-determination for other peoples, but that
they share common foundations and must be treated as equal in scope. This
opens the door for further unified development of the right to selfdetermination for all peoples.133
Finally, the analysis highlights the crucial shift towards empowerment
that UNDRIP represents, which was previously lacking for indigenous
peoples under the international human rights framework. As such, UNDRIP
provides an important benchmark of the standards required to ensure
indigenous peoples achieve full enjoyment of their rights.
Nonetheless, if UNDRIP is not implemented by states, its potential
will be frustrated, as illustrated in Australia. Australia was influential in the
development of the draft,134 but ultimately voted against UNDRIP’s adoption
in the GA, citing dissatisfaction with the inclusion of self-determination as
an important factor in its negative vote. 135 On April 3, 2009, however,
Australia announced its support for UNDRIP.136 UN experts hailed this as a
crucial step in increasing the international consensus on indigenous rights,137
but the careful language of Australia’s official endorsement cautions against
any hasty conclusion that Australia’s fundamental position on the core issues
of contention had changed.138
On the whole, it would be unrealistic to argue that Australia is
currently under a clear legal obligation to ensure indigenous selfdetermination in accordance with UNDRIP. As soft law, UNDRIP is not
binding, and it cannot yet be said that indigenous self-determination is a
132

Compare Quane, supra note 31, at 267 (identifying the common foundations, but seeing UNDRIP
as a departure from existing law).
133
This approach is supported by ANAYA (2000), supra note 35, at 6-12; Henriksen, supra note 69, at
141.
134
Daes, supra note 26, at 798; Daes, supra note 33, at 16.
135
General Assembly meeting record, supra note 126, at 11.
136
Macklin, supra note 97.
137
Statement by Special Rapporteur James Anaya, United Nations Expert Mechanism on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP) Chairperson John Henriksen and UNPFII Chairperson Victoria TauliCorpuz, UN Experts Welcome Australia’s Endorsement of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (April 3, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/
Australia_endorsement_UNDRIP.pdf.
138
Macklin, supra note 97. The single mention of self-determination avoids using the word “right”
and repeats that UNDRIP cannot be used to undermine territorial integrity.
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customary norm of international law; nor has it been incorporated into
Australia’s domestic law. However, Australia is actually under binding
international obligations in respect of the foundations of self-determination:
non-discrimination and participation;139 on this basis it arguably does have
an indirect obligation to uphold indigenous self-determination. Moreover,
Australia has recognized that it will be measured against UNDRIP’s
standards, and has itself referred to some of UNDRIP’s provisions when
defending NTER. 140 Indigenous self-determination has been a prominent
issue in Australia in the past,141 and its relevance will gather new momentum
as UNDRIP’s influence develops under international law. Already there is
considerable pressure within Australia for attitudes towards indigenous selfdetermination to develop in line with international standards, and for the
federal, state and territory governments to show they are truly dedicated to
implementing the goals of UNDRIP.142
Having articulated the ingredients of indigenous self-determination at
the international level, the remainder of this article considers the
international legal foundations of self-determination at the domestic level.
The next section discusses the Intervention, as a topical example in which
the fundamental prerequisites for indigenous self-determination have been
lacking. Australia has vacillated between support and opposition for
UNDRIP, but the measures it took in 2007 to address indigenous
disadvantage were wholly inconsistent with any notion of empowerment,
and thus with the developing norm of self-determination in international law.
Looking back at the lessons of the Intervention is important
preparation for the next stage in Australia’s battle to move beyond current
levels of entrenched indigenous disadvantage. It is also relevant beyond its
domestic context because it illustrates that existing protections of the
fundamental rights underpinning self-determination have been inadequate to
guarantee full enjoyment of the rights of indigenous peoples on an equal
139

See infra, sections III(B) and III(C).
ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38, para. 48, 54.
141
See Sanders, supra note 125; Peter Billings, Still Paying the Price for Benign Intentions?
Contextualising Contemporary Interventions in the Lives of Aboriginal Peoples, 33 MELBOURNE U. L. REV.
1 (2009); Geoffrey Partington, Hasluck versus Coombs: White Politics and Australia's Aboriginals,
electronic pdf version (2005), available at www.bennelong.com.au/books/pdf/PartingtonWeb.pdf.
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See, e.g., the work of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner,
available at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social_justice/index.html; the widely-endorsed statement entitled
“Rebuilding from the Ground Up: Alternative to the Intervention” initiated by STICS and the Intervention
Rollback Action Group (demanding that all indigenous policy comply with UNDRIP), available at
http://stoptheintervention.org/alternatives-to-the-intervention (last visited Oct. 16, 2011); numerous
submissions to the Senate inquiry in connection with the Stronger Futures package are available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=clac_ctte/strong_futu
re_nt_11/submissions.htm.
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level with other peoples, and serves as a warning of the consequences that
arise when a state attempts to improve the situation of indigenous peoples
without adhering to evolving standards of international law.
III.

INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION AND NTER
The Intervention is a victory for anybody obtuse enough to
believe that human misery can be alleviated while ignoring
human dignity.143

This section starts by introducing the background and key features of
the Intervention. It then applies the interpretation of self-determination
advocated above to NTER, by examining in more depth the two major rights
underpinning indigenous self-determination in international law, and
assessing the extent to which NTER demonstrates a failure on Australia’s
part to comply with these norms.
A.

The Intervention

1.

Ampe Akelyernemane Meke Mekarle: Little Children Are Sacred

On August 8, 2006, following growing concern about the issue of
child abuse in Aboriginal communities,144 the NT government appointed a
Board of Inquiry (“the Board”) to investigate the prevalence of sexual abuse
of Aboriginal children in NT communities, particularly unreported abuse,
and to consider how to improve governmental and non-governmental
practices and procedures to “effectively prevent and tackle child abuse.”145
After extensive research, including wide consultations with Aboriginal
peoples and service providers, the Board provided its report, Little Children
Are Sacred, to the NT government on April 30, 2007. The report was
released publicly on June 15, 2007.
Little Children Are Sacred confirmed that child abuse was a serious
problem in Aboriginal communities in NT and that it often went
unreported. 146 Harrowing stories documented by the Board exposed a
disturbing range of patterns and cycles of abuse and sexualization of
children, with frequent violations of both “mainstream” law and long
established Aboriginal laws, often perpetrated by children or young people
143
Nicole Watson, Of Course It Wouldn't Be Done in Dickson! Why Howard's Battlers Disengaged
From the Northern Territory Emergency Response, 8 Borderlands e-journal 1, 17 (2009).
144
See Marcia Langton, Trapped in the Aboriginal Reality Show, 19 GRIFFITH REVIEW (2007).
145
LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED, supra note 14, at 4. The two Board members and co-chairs, Rex
Wild QC and Patricia Anderson, were appointed under the Northern Territory Inquiries Act 2006 (Aust.).
146
LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED, supra note 14, at 16.
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themselves, both male and female. 147 Such reports give rise to extreme
concern about Australia’s compliance with international obligations to
protect the rights of children.148 The Board recommended that Aboriginal
child sexual abuse in the Northern Territory be designated as an issue of
urgent national significance.
The Board warned against a crisis-driven, band-aid response,
however, and took pains to dispel various myths perpetuated in the
mainstream media about the nature of and reasons behind Aboriginal child
abuse.149 The Board pointed out that similar and significant problems of
child abuse and neglect exist in all sectors of society, nationally and
internationally, and that in NT as elsewhere it is a direct symptom of other
areas of social breakdown caused by “the usual suspects”–for example
poverty, a lack of education, poor health, alcohol and drug abuse,
unemployment, overcrowded housing, and general disempowerment.150 The
Board emphasized that many reports presented over the years had illustrated
the same problems and suggested the same solutions for tackling these wider
issues 151 –that the recommendations in Little Children Are Sacred were
nothing new, but decisive action was long overdue. 152 Noting that
realistically it might take a generation for the real benefits of change to be
felt, they stressed it was imperative the first steps be taken immediately as a
matter of extreme urgency to avert a looming disaster.153 It required:
[A] concerted, determined effort to break the cycle and provide
the necessary strength, power and appropriate support to local
services and communities, so they can lead themselves out of
the malaise: in a word, empowerment!154
These central messages of the need for genuine empowerment and the
urgency of the situation were repeated in compelling language throughout
the Board’s descriptions of its consultations with Aboriginal people and its
97 specific recommendations for action.

147

LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED, supra note 14, at 59-73.
See especially the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 19, Month, Day, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3. Australia ratified the Convention in 1990.
149
See, e.g., LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED, supra note 14, at 12, 57-59.
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Aboriginal communities, see Steven Etherington, The Most Threatened People in Australia: The Remote
Aboriginal Minority, in Johns (ed.), supra note 57, at 59-77; Langton, supra note 144.
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See also Howard-Wagner, supra note 2; Langton, supra note 144.
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Key Features of the Intervention

Australia’s response to Little Children Are Sacred picked up on the
message of urgency, but it did so at the expense of the opportunity to build
empowerment. On June 15, 2007, the day the report was publicly released,
the federal government issued a press release declaring it was committed to
doing “whatever it takes to bring an end to this insidious behaviour in
Indigenous communities.”155 Six days later, Australia announced it would
be launching an emergency intervention into Aboriginal communities in
NT.156 State and federal troops were deployed in NT shortly thereafter.157
Within just seven weeks, a comprehensive and complex suite of
legislation had been approved by federal Parliament.158 Prime Minister John
Howard said the federal government was taking over with a “sweeping
assumption of power.” 159 The government said action was necessary to
“stabilise” communities before the “normalisation” and “exit” phases could
begin.160 Aboriginal communities were described as a “failed society.”161
Reforms included significant changes to the welfare system, including
compulsory income management and linking welfare payments to children’s
school attendance; restrictions on sales and use of alcohol and pornography
155
Mal Brough, CGA Press Release, NT Child Abuse Inquiry (June 15, 2007), available at
http://www.formerministers.fahcsia.gov.au/3517/ntcai_15jun07/, (last visitedFeb. 4, 2013).
156
Mal Brough & John Howard, CGA Media Release, National Emergency Response to Protect
Aboriginal Children in the NT (June 21, 2007), available at http://www.formerministers.fahcsia.gov.au/
3581/emergency_21june07/, (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). [hereinafter Brough & Howard Press Release].
157
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), Insiders, Interview with Mal Brough MP (June 24,
2007) available at http://www.abc.net.au/insiders/content/2007/s1960087.htm, last visited Apr. 2, 2011)
[hereinafter “Brough Insiders Interview”].
158
See Jonathon Hunyor, Is It Time to Re-Think Special Measures Under the Racial Discrimination
Act?: The Case of the Northern Territory Intervention, 14 AUS. J. OF HUM. RTS. 39, 59 (2009). The initial
Intervention legislation package comprised five statutes: Northern Territory National Emergency Response
Act 2007 (Cth) (Austl.) [hereinafter NTERA]; Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare
Payment Reform) Act 2007 (Cth) (Austl.) [hereinafter “WPRA”]; Families, Community Services and
Indigenous Affairs and Other Legislation Amendment (Northern Territory National Emergency Response
and Other Measures) Act 2007 (Cth) and two appropriation Acts.
159
John Howard PM, Address to the Sydney Institute (June 25, 2007) available at
http://www.antar.org.au/node/86, (last visited 2 Apr. 2011) [hereinafter “Howard Sydney Institute
Address”]. For discussion of concerns about the excessive and ultra vires exercise of federal executive
power within NT, see Wurridjal v Australia [2009] HCA 2, per Kirby J (dissent), para. 226-234 (Austl.)
and Greg McIntyre, An Imbalance of Constitutional Power and Human Rights: The 2007 Federal
Intervention in the Northern Territory, 14 JAMES COOK U. L. REV. 81, 94-100 (2007).
160
See CGA, Official Committee Hansard, Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional
Affairs, Reference: Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) Bill
2007 and Four Related Bills Concerning the Northern Territory National Emergency Response (Aug. 10,
2007), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S10473.pdf [hereinafter Committee
Hansard 2007]; Howard, supra note 159.
161
CGA, House of Representatives, Official Hansard, Northern Territory National Emergency
Response Bill 2007: second reading speech by Mal Brough MP (Aug. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/reps/dailys/ dr070807.pdf [hereinafter Second Reading NTER].
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in prescribed areas; the acquisition and control of Aboriginal townships
through compulsory five-year leases to the government; an increased police
presence in NT communities; the appointment of external managers of all
government business in communities; and the removal of customary law as
mitigation in sentencing and bail decisions.162
NTER represented a “remarkable governmental intrusion by the
Commonwealth into the daily lives of Australian citizens in the Northern
Territory, identified mostly by reference to their race.”163 In the words of the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, “the
extent to which the Intervention would shift the social, cultural and legal
landscapes of Aboriginal communities in NT was immediately obvious.”164
The full scope of Intervention measures is too wide to cover in detail here,
particularly as the focus of the critique is on the overarching approach, not
the substance of the numerous different policies introduced under NTER
umbrella. Where specific examples are required to support the arguments in
this article, the author has chosen to focus mainly on the compulsory income
management regime, in an attempt to engage with issues central to one of
the most controversial reforms introduced by NTER. NTER Review Board
in 2008 observed that income management “has become synonymous with
NTER and is the most widely recognized measure.” 165 The regime
continues to have significant ongoing relevance not only because it affects a
large number of people on a day-to-day level, but because legislative
amendments have broadened and extended income management.
Compulsory income management for welfare recipients was one of
the major reforms of the Intervention, and one in which the procedural and
substantive failings of Australia’s approach were particularly glaring. 166
Under the regime, 50% of individuals’ income support and 100% of
162

See McIntyre, supra note 159, at 84-91; Billings, supra note 141; COERCIVE RECONCILIATION:
STABILISE, NORMALISE, EXIT ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIA (Jon Altman & Melinda Hinkson eds., 2007)
[hereinafter COERCIVE RECONCILIATION].
163
Wurridjal v. Australia para. 243 (Kirby J. dissenting).
164
HREOC, REPORT OF THE ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER SOCIAL JUSTICE
COMMISSIONER, Social Justice Report 2007 (Report Jan. 2008), available at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/socia
l_justice/sj_report/sjreport 07/pdf/sjr_2007.pdf [hereinafter HREOC SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2007].
165
REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra note 24, at 20.
166
This article only considers the regime under the Social Security Administration Act 1991 (Cth)
[hereinafter SSAA], s 123UB (inserted by WPRA, Schedule 1, s 17 but repealed by WRRRDA, s 12),
triggered by a beneficiary’s physical presence in a relevant Northern Territory area (as distinct from the
regime under SSAA, ss 123UC-123UF). Regimes set up in other parts of Australia have operated
differently; the Northern Territory version is the “most punitive and oppressive.” See J. Sutton, Emergency
Welfare Reforms: A Mirror to the Past?, 33 ALT. L.J. 27 (2008). See also Thalia Anthony, The Return to
the Legal and Citizenship Void: Indigenous Welfare Quarantining in the Northern Territory and Cape
York, 10 BALAYI: CULTURE L. AND COLONIALISM 29 (2009); Peter Billings, Social Welfare Experiments in
Australia: More Trials for Aboriginal Families?, 17 J. SOCIAL SECURITY L. 164 (2010).
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advances and lump sum payments made to them are diverted to an income
management account controlled by the national welfare agency. 167 After
deduction of expenses like rent and fines, the quarantined portion can only
be spent in specially licensed stores using a “BasicsCard” that clearly
identifies the holder as subject to income management; this money is not
accessible as cash.168 The quarantined portion is to be used for “priority
needs” such as food and clothing,169 and cannot be spent on excluded goods
and services, including alcohol, pornography, gambling and tobacco.170
Compulsory income management constitutes a significant interference
with the daily lives and choices of those affected, at a very personal level.
This is not to say that some participants might not find it beneficial, and a
case could certainly be made for implementing voluntary income
management systems, as a matter of policy.171 But the crucial point to be
highlighted here is that the original reforms were imposed on all welfare
recipients in the prescribed areas with no room for differentiation on the
basis of individual circumstances. It seems Australia believed blanket
restrictions on individuals were justified by supposed benefits for the wider
community: the primary purpose was to “manage income flow to each
community as a whole” in order to “encourage expenditure on those goods
and services that will lead to better outcomes for the children in those
communities.”172 The Prime Minister described the overriding objective of
income quarantining as being “to reduce the amount of money finding its
way towards alcohol and drugs in indigenous communities during the
emergency period.” Part of the motivation was to provide “a clear signal to
the communities.”173
NTER also removed the right of appeal to the Social Security Appeals
Tribunal and Administrative Appeals Tribunal, leaving no feasible option for
167

See Social Security Administration Act (“SSAA”), ss 123XA-123XH (repealed).
SSAA, s 123YE, as amended by WPRA, Schedule 1, s 17.
SSAA, s 123TH.
170
SSAA, s 123TI.
171
Both the REVIEW BOARD REPORT in 2008, supra note 24 at 20-21, and the CGA, NORTHERN
TERRITORY EMERGENCY RESPONSE EVALUATION REPORT 2011 [hereinafter 2011 NTER EVALUATION
REPORT], are available at http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/indigenous/pubs/nter_reports/Documents/nter_eval
uation_report_2011.pdf (providing anecdotal evidence that a number of community members subject to
income management, particularly women, found it useful in avoiding “humbugging” from family members
for cash and in ensuring that sufficient funds were budgeted for meeting family needs.).
172
CGA, SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, REPORT, SOCIAL
SECURITY AND OTHER LEGISLATION AMENDMENT (WELFARE PAYMENT REFORM) BILL 2007 AND FOUR
RELATED BILLS CONCERNING THE NORTHERN TERRITORY NATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PARA. 2.63
(AUGUST 2007), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/20
04-07/nt_emergency/report/report.pdf [hereinafter SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT 2007].
173
Howard, supra note 159.
168
169
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external review to challenge income quarantining in any particular case.174
The explanation for this extraordinary departure from due process was that
appeals would “take too long and interfere with the Intervention timeframe;”
it was implied that the abrogation of appeal rights was unimportant anyway
because “people would only have their income managed for 12 months, and
it would only be half of it.”175
3.

Criticism of the Intervention

The initial Intervention methodology has been extensively
criticized,176 including by the Northern Territory Government,177 the authors
of Little Children Are Sacred, 178 and Aboriginal representatives: for
example, Galarrwuy Yunupingu, an Aboriginal leader who initially
supported the Intervention, withdrew his support and in August 2009
described it as a form of apartheid,179 and a group of Aboriginal people from
various NT communities submitted a request for urgent action to the UN
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”),180 while
others lodged claims for refugee status in protest.181 As noted above, there is
no denying that action was urgently required.182 The major success of the
Intervention is that it focused national attention on the problems afflicting
NT communities and stimulated a large injection of much-needed funding
for increased service provision and infrastructure within those communities.
However, the anecdotal evidence, along with what little reliable empirical
174
SSAA, s 144(ka), inserted by WPRA, Schedule 1, s 18 (now repealed); National Welfare Rights
Network, Submission No. 44 to Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee (2007), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-07/nt_emergency/
submissions/sub44.pdf; Billings, supra note 141.
175
Senate Committee Report 2007, supra note 172, para. 2.64. A right of appeal through the Social
Security Appeals Tribunal was provided in 2009.
176
Individual critics are too numerous to list here; for a summary of major problems, see Altman &
Hinkson (eds.), supra note 162; ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38, ay Appendix B; Request for Urgent
Action under ICERD in relation to the Commonwealth Government of Australia (Jan. 28, 2009, updated
Aug. 11, 2009) submitted by a group of Aboriginal Australians affected by NTER, through legal
representatives, available at http://www.hrlrc.org.au/files/E75QFXXYE7/Request_for_Urgent_Action_
Cerd.pdf and http://www.hrlrc.org.au/files/Update-to-CERD-11-August-2009.pdf [hereinafter “ICERD
Request”].
177
Northern Territory Government, Submission No. 127 to Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs
Committee, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/20047/nt_emergency/submissions/sub127.pdf.
178
Lateline: Business, interview with Rex Wild QC, ABC, June 27, 2007, available at
http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2007/s1964086.htm, (last visited Apr. 2, 2011); Rex Wild QC,
Unforeseen Circumstances, in Altman & Hinkson (eds.), supra note 162, at 111-20.
179
Ben Schokman, Opinion: Sorry About the Intervention, 35 ALT. L.J. 2, 2 (2010).
180
ICERD Request, supra note 176.
181
Phoebe Stewart, Aboriginal People Seek Refugee Status, ABC NEWS, Aug. 26, 2009, available at
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/08/26/2667066.htm?site=news, (last visited Apr. 6, 2011).
182
See Langton, supra note 144; LITTLE CHILDREN ARE SACRED, supra note 14.
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evidence there is, suggests that the approach taken by the Australian
government when it launched the Intervention may have contributed more to
some of the underlying problems than to their solutions–even where
individual measures might themselves have otherwise been welcomed. 183
Although all action at the national level was purportedly designed to protect
children from harm in response to Little Children Are Sacred, 184 the
Intervention did not implement the report’s 97 specific recommendations.185
State representatives claimed to have closely considered Australia’s
international obligations when drafting the Intervention legislation. 186
However, NTER (including the income management regime in particular)
was widely condemned as inconsistent with Australia’s international human
rights obligations.187 The criticism was characterized by two major recurring
themes: first, that the Intervention was racially discriminatory, and second,
that people living in target communities were not given a chance to be
involved in designing or implementing the measures that were ostensibly
intended to protect their rights, and those of their children.188 Subsequent
efforts in 2009 and 2010 to amend NTER and increase participation were a
step in the right direction, but they did not adequately remedy these
deficiencies.189

183
See, e.g., Larissa Behrendt, Back to the Future for Indigenous Australia, in ALL THAT’S LEFT:
WHAT LABOR SHOULD STAND FOR 113-34 (Nick Dyrenfurth & Tim Soutphomasane eds., 2010); Nicholas
Rothwell, Destroyed in Alice, THE AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 19, 2011; AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT: DEPT. OF
FAMILIES, HOUSING, COMMUNITY SERVICES, AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, CLOSING THE GAP: ENGAGEMENT
AND PARTNERSHIP WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLE,
available at http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/ourresponsibilities/indigenous-australians/programs-services/closing-the-gap/closing-the-gap-engagementand-partnership-with-indigenous-people, (last visited July 8, 2012) [hereinafter CLOSING THE GAP];
HREOC SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2007, supra note 164; REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra note 24; ICERD
Request, supra note 176; Billings, supra note 141; CULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS RESEARCH CENTRE
AUSTRALIA, REPORT ON NTER REDESIGN ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION (2009),
available at http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/indigenous/pubs/nter_reports/Documents/redesign_engagement_
strategy/final_report_09_engage_strat.pdf, [hereinafter CIRCA REPORT 2009]; NTER EVALUATION
REPORT 2011, supra note 171; CGA, Senate, Proof Hansard, Social Security Legislation Amendment Bill
2011, Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Bill 2012, Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory
(Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2011–Second (June 28, 2012), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hanssen261110 [hereinafter Stronger Futures
Senate Hansard 2012].
184
See Brough & Howard Media Release, supra note 156.
185
ICERD Request, supra note 176, para. 6.
186
Committee Hansard 2007, supra note 160, at 11.
187
See ANAYA REPORT 2008, supra note 30; ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38, at Appendix B.
188
These themes are evident throughout the criticism, and reflected in NTER Review Board’s
recommendations. See REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra note 183. See also ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra
note 38.
189
See Vivian, supra note 19; Amnesty International, Submission No. 19 supra note 19; HREOC
REPORT ON RDA AND SPECIAL MEASURES, supra note 19; see also infra III(B)(2) and III(C)(2).
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These two themes of criticism form the parameters of discussion in
the next two sections. With any high-profile policy initiative there will
always be those who think it is inadequate and those who argue it went too
far. Many critics of the critics viewed the outcry over the human rights
violations of the Intervention methods as masking the true need for a
response on behalf of children and other vulnerable people living in
struggling communities; some argued consultations and negotiations were a
waste of time, and said the communities needed tough love.190 A detailed
consideration of the political arguments advanced in support of various
positions on both sides of the fence is beyond the scope of this article, which
is limited to an assessment of Australia’s methodology against the criteria of
participation and non-discrimination that the author has identified as
fundamental to fostering self-determination under international law.
From this perspective, the paternalistic approach taken in NTER is
strikingly at odds with the standards in UNDRIP, which are minimum
standards of achievement to be pursued in a spirit of partnership and mutual
respect.191 This claim is not to privilege matters of process and procedure
over the substance of the problems that NTER purported to target; it comes
from a recognition that no matter how laudable the motives, lasting change
cannot be effected if the steps taken to address the crisis themselves violate
the rights of the intended beneficiaries. The methodology of NTER lacked
both essential foundations for self-determination: the rights to freedom from
discrimination and participation in decision-making. The next two sections
develop this argument by examining each of those foundations in more
detail under international law, and analyzing their application in NT.
B.

The Right to be Free from Racial Discrimination

1.

International Law

International law provides a clear and well-established universal right
to be free from discrimination. Besides its inclusion in numerous
international and regional instruments, 192 non-discrimination is arguably a
non-derogable jus cogens norm and a right erga omnes under customary
international law. 193 The principle of non-discrimination “permeates the
190
See, e.g., Langton, supra note 144; PETER SUTTON, THE POLITICS OF SUFFERING: INDIGENOUS
AUSTRALIA AND THE END OF THE LIBERAL CONSENSUS (2009).
191
UNDRIP, preambular para. 24; art. 43. (
192
See, e.g., U.N. Charter, arts. 1(3), 13(1)(b), 55(c), 56, 76(c); UDHR, arts. 1, 2, 7; ICCPR, arts. 2,
26; ICESCR arts. 2(2), 3; ICERD, art. 2; ILO Convention 169, art. 6.
193
See, e.g., South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), 1966 I.C.J. 293, para. 6 (1966) (per Judge
Tanaka dissenting); Barcelona Traction, Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, para. 32 (1970); Juridical Condition and
Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18,
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guarantee of all other rights and freedoms under domestic and international
law.” 194 UNDRIP emphasizes that indigenous peoples are equal to all
others, and that they have the right, collectively and individually, to freedom
from any kind of discrimination.195
The pertinent elements of the definition of racial discrimination in
Article 1.1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (1969) (“CERD”) can be summarized, for present
purposes, as any distinction that is based on race, and has the purpose or
effect of impairing equal enjoyment of rights in any field of public life.
Historically, attempts to address discrimination against indigenous
peoples have commonly taken either an integrationist/assimilationist
approach, or a paternalist/protectionist approach, which are themselves
discriminatory.196 The first of these treats equality as “sameness:” the idea
has been to assimilate indigenous peoples into the dominant culture so that
differences are eventually eroded.197 The second approach, paternalism, is
particularly prevalent in colonialist state-indigenous relationships: states
claim to be protecting indigenous peoples by deciding what is good for
them. Tennant describes it as the “primitivisation” of indigenous peoples.198
International attitudes have largely shifted away from these
approaches. 199 UNDRIP reflects this evolution, placing a high value on
diversity and respect for cultural differences, and emphasizing the need to
foster partnerships with indigenous peoples as an element of their right to
self-determination, instead of imposing assistance in a top-down manner.200
2.

Discrimination in NTER

Unfortunately, the Intervention flew in the face of these
developments.
Special Rapporteur Anaya considered the original
Intervention measures to be aggressive and extraordinary, with deep
implications for a range of fundamental rights, but especially for the right to
para. 173(4) (Sept. 17, 2003). See also ICCPR, art. 4(1); Anaya Report 2010, supra note 38, at Appendix B,
para. 18, 60; INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 78 (HENRY STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN
GOODMAN, EDS., 3d ed. 2008).
194
Maya (Toledo) v. Belize, supra note 44, at para. 163. See also HRC, General Comment No 23,
supra note 78; Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, supra note 193, at para. 101; Legal Resources
Foundation v. Zambia, African Comm’n on Human and People’s Rights, Communication No. 211/98, para.
63 (2001).
195
SeeUNDRIP preamble, arts. 2, 4, 5, 9, 18, 22; arts 1, 2, 9, 14-17, 21, 22, 24, 29, 44, 46, supra note
90; Barelli, supra note 30, at 961.
196
For Australian examples, see Billings, supra note 141; Chesterman & Douglas, supra note 2.
197
See Otto, supra note 2; Falk, supra note 30, at 33.
198
Tennant, supra note 10.
199
See, e.g., Eide, supra note 4, at 163-67; MARTÍNEZ-COBO REPORT 1983, supra note 38, at para. 42.
200
See, e.g., UNDRIP preamble, arts. 1, 2, 8-15, 19, 38.
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non-discrimination.201 Similar concerns about the discriminatory aspects of
NTER were expressed by the HRC,202 CERD,203 and the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”),204 as well as by many
others within Australia.205
Australia is a party to ICERD.206 Section 9(1) of the RDA, which
makes acts of racial discrimination by any person unlawful in Australia,
incorporates in full the definition of racial discrimination from article 1.1
ICERD summarized above.207 Applying this definition to the original NTER
income management regime, it is clear that these measures made a
distinction on the basis of race, which had the effect of impairing the
enjoyment of rights on an equal footing with other Australians in a number
of spheres of public life.
As to the first element, state officials asserted that the Intervention
was not a matter of race, 208 and sidestepped direct questions about
discrimination. 209 However, the legislation itself and its explanatory
memoranda leave no room for doubt that NTER was aimed specifically at
Aboriginal people. The blanket application of the income management
regime, for example, was triggered by an individual’s physical presence in
“prescribed areas” under the Northern Territory Emergency Response Act
2007 (Cth; NTERA).210 Subsections 4(2)(a) and (b) of NTERA expressly
201

ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38, at para. 46 and Appendix B para. 2.
Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/AUS/CO/5
para. 14 (May 7, 2009).
203
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Urgent Action Letters to the Australian
Government (Mar. 13, 2009 and Sept. 28, 2009), available at http://www.hrlc.org.au/content/topics/
equality/northern-territory-intervention-request-for-urgent-action-cerd/, (last visited Apr. 7, 2011)
[hereinafter CERD Urgent Action Letters]; Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
Concluding Observations: Australia, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/AUS/CO/15-17 (Aug. 27, 2010) [hereinafter
CERD Report 2010].
204
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: Australia, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/AUS/CO/4, para. 15 (June 12, 2009).
205
See, e.g., numerous submissions to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional
Affairs, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiri es/200407/nt_emergency/submissions/sublist.htm, (last visited Apr. 1, 2011); HREOC SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT
2007, supra note 164; Altman & Hinkson, supra note 162; REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra note 24; Vivian,
supra note 19, at 46; Billings, supra notes 141 and 166; Chesterman & Douglas, supra note 2; Watson,
supra note 143; Yananymul Munungurr, CEO of Laynhapuy Homelands Association Incorporated, Stop
the Intervention: Self-Determination not Assimilation, Homelands address (June 20, 2009), available at
http://rollbacktheintervention.wordpress.com/statements (last visited Nov. 10, 2010); ICERD Request,
supra note 176; Graeme Innes, Race Discrimination Commissioner (HREOC), Address to UN Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Aug. 11, 2010), available at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/about/
media/speeches/race/2010/20100811_CERD.html (last visited 6 Apr. 2011.)
206
Australia signed on October 13, 1966 and ratified on September 30, 1975.
207
The Act binds the Crown. See RDA, s 6.
208
Howard Sydney Institute Address, supra note 159.
209
Brough Insiders interview, supra note 157.
210
See SSAA, ss 123UB and 123TD(a) (both repealed).
202
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tied the meaning of “prescribed areas” to the definition of Aboriginal land
within the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976. The
prescribed areas covered about 600,000 kilometers, containing 500
communities occupied almost entirely by Aboriginal people; seventy percent
of the Aboriginal population of NT live in those areas.211
Putting the racial nature of the regime beyond doubt is the fact that the
Intervention legislation expressly excluded the operation of Part II of the
RDA in respect of NTER measures. 212 The RDA is an “exhaustive and
exclusive” statement of the law on racial discrimination in Australia, 213
enacted for the purpose of implementing ICERD domestically. 214 The
inference is that suspending this legislation would only be necessary if
NTER measures contravened its protections.215 This inference is reinforced
by Section 10 RDA, which provides that any law operating to deny or
reduce the equal enjoyment of rights on a racial basis will have no effect on
the enjoyment of those rights. If Australia had not excluded the RDA,
Section 10 would have prevented implementation of the racially
discriminatory measures of the Intervention.216
The conclusion that there was a racial distinction is unavoidable. As
for the second element of the discrimination test, which checks the purpose
or effect of the distinction, the purpose of the income management regime
was to “stem the flow of cash that is expended on substance abuse and
gambling” for the protection of children.217 Leaving aside the question of
whether compulsory income management for adults is an appropriate or
effective means of protecting children,218 that protection is, of course, a valid
objective. However, the actual effect of the distinction has been a significant
impairment of the exercise of various rights protected under international
human rights law, such as the right to equality before the law,219 including in
respect of treatment before tribunals, 220 the right to social security, 221 the

211

See ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38.
NTERA, s131(2).
213
Viskauskas v Niland [1983] HCA 15, para. 8 (Austl.).
214
Id. See also RDA, preamble; Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen [1982] HCA 27, para. 5 (Austl.);
Gerhardy v Brown [1985] HCA 11 (Austl.); Viskauskas v Niland [1983] HCA 15 (Austl.).
215
Arguably it was unnecessary to do this expressly because under Australian law a later Act that is
inconsistent with an earlier Act is deemed to repeal the earlier one to the extent of the inconsistency. See
McIntyre, supra note 159, at 107, discussing Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 99 (Austl.).
216
RDA, s 10 reflects ICERD, art. 2(1)(c); see Viskauskas v Niland, supra note 213 at para. 10.
217
NTERB Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16, at 11.
218
See Billings, supra note 166; Howard-Wagner, supra note 2; Behrendt, supra note 183.
219
UDHR, art. 7; ICCPR, art. 26.
220
ICERD, art. 5(a); ICCPR, art. 14.
221
ICESCR, art. 9; ICERD, art. 5(e)(iv). See also Billings, supra note 166.
212
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right to an effective remedy,222 the right to enjoy one’s culture,223 and the
right to an adequate standard of living. 224 It clearly breaches many
provisions of UNDRIP.225
The strong emphasis on racial equality that permeates general human
rights law, and particularly UNDRIP, has been severely undermined in
Australia through NTER. It is inconceivable that the same punitive
approaches would be taken in response to reports of child abuse in other
sectors of Australian society.226
Senior Australian government officials responsible for orchestrating
the Intervention were dismissive of UN criticism. 227 International human
rights mechanisms have had difficulty breaking through in Australia. 228
However, the federal government’s own assessment report also raised
discrimination as a serious concern, and recommended action to reinstate the
RDA in NT. 229 The resulting legislative amendments implemented some
necessary changes, 230 but their practical effect for those already under
income management was limited. 231 Critics said nothing less than full
reinstatement of the RDA was sufficient and that NTER as redesigned was
still discriminatory in fact.232 Certainly it is unlikely the formal legislative
222
ICERD, art. 6. See also Wurridjal v Australia, (Kirby J. dissenting), para. 213-4 (about a
challenge to compulsory leases under NTER).
223
ICCPR, art. 27. See also Vivian, supra note 70.
224
ICESCR, art. 11; UDHR, art. 25.
225
See, e.g., arts. 9, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21-23.
226
See Watson, supra note 143; Amnesty International, supra note 19; Billings, supra note 141. See
also Wurridjal v Australia, (Kirby J. dissenting).
227
Natasha Robinson, Howard Ministers Dismiss U.N. Criticism of Indigenous Intervention, THE
AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 29, 2009.
228
See Sylvia Arzey & Luke McNamara, Invoking International Human Rights Law in a ‘RightsFree Zone’: Indigenous Justice Campaigns in Australia, 33 HUM. RTS. Q. 733 (2011).
229
REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra note 24.
230
See, e.g., repealing the provisions expressly excluding anti-discrimination legislation (WRRRDA,
Schedule 1) and repealing SSAA, s 123UB (see supra, note 166).
231
WRRRDA repeals SSAA, s 123UB but continues income management for those who were
already subject to it under that provision. It also adds new categories of eligibility for income management:
“vulnerable welfare recipients”, “disengaged youth”, and “long-term welfae recipients” (SSAA, ss
123UCA, 123UCB and 123UCC respectively). Concerns about the amended regime were expressed by
HREOC. See Submission to the ICERD Committee (July 8, 2010), available at
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/legal/submissions/united_nations/ICERD2010.html, (last visited Apr. 6, 2011)
[hereinafter HREOC Submission 2010].
232
See Amnesty International, supra note 19; Nicholson et al., supra note 19; HREOC Report on
RDA and Special Measures, supra note 19; Alastair Nicholson, The Failure of the Rudd Government’s
Aboriginal Policy, Stop the Intervention Collective Sydney (STICS) Forum (March 29, 2010); CERD
REPORT 2010, supra note 203; Watson, supra note 143; Vivian, supra note 19; HREOC Submission 2010,
supra note 231; CGA, Official Committee Hansard, Community Affairs Legislation Committee, Reference:
Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of Racial
Discrimination Act) Bill 2009 (Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commtte
e/S12774.pdf [sic], (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Committee Hansard 2010].
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amendments are adequate to ameliorate the serious negative effects of “felt”
discrimination and stigma subjectively experienced by Aboriginal people in
NT since the Intervention was launched.233
In its defense, Australia consistently asserted that the measures taken
were necessary to ensure that indigenous people in NT enjoyed their rights
on an equal footing with other Australians, and were therefore justified by
the doctrine of special measures.234 Given the prima facie discriminatory
nature of these measures, even after the 2010 amendments, that assertion
demands scrutiny.
3.

The Role of “Special Measures”

It is well established that formal equality in law is insufficient to
guarantee actual freedom from discrimination.235 As Martínez-Cobo put it,
notwithstanding de jure equality and the widespread condemnation of
discrimination, de facto discrimination against indigenous peoples continues
around the world. 236 Berhendt argues that in Australia, formal equality
offers false promises and has actually allowed indigenous socioeconomic
disadvantage to continue.237
To counteract this reality, special measures may be required for
indigenous peoples to exercise their rights fully and equally with the rest of
the population.238 Article 1.4 ICERD, which is incorporated into Australian
federal law through section 8(1) of the RDA, provides that:
233
Committee Hansard 2010, supra note 232; Schokman, supra note 179; Billings, supra note 141
and 166; Martiniello, supra note 2; Howard-Wagner, supra note 2; REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra note 24;
Innes, supra note 205; Equality Rights Alliance, Women’s Experience of Income Management in the
Northern Territory (2011), available at http://www.equalityrightsalliance.org.au/sites/equalityrightsalliance
.org.au/files/docs/readings/income_management_report_v1-4_0.pdf.
234
See, e.g., NTERB Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 16; Special Rapporteur, S. James Anaya,
Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies received, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/9/Add.1 12-14
(Aug. 15, 2008), 12-14; CGA, House of Representatives, Social Security and Other Legislation
Amendment (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of Racial Discrimination Act) Bill 2009 (Cth)
Explanatory Memorandum, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/ssaolararordab2009
984/memo_0.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) [hereinafter “WRRRDA Explanatory Memorandum”].
235
Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64, at 19 (Apr. 6);
South West Africa Cases, supra note 193, at para. 305-306, per Tanaka J (dissent); Maya (Toledo) v.
Belize, supra note 44, at para. 162, 169; Gerhardy v Brown [1985] HCA 11, para. 25 per Brennan J
(Austl.); YATAMA v. Nicaragua, supra note 130; Endorois v. Kenya, supra note 130; HRC, CCPR
General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, 146. (Nov. 10, 1989). See
also, ILO Convention 169, art. 6(1)(b)
236
Special Rapporteur, Study on the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations:
Final Report, Part I, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/476/Add.3 (June 26, 1981) (by José Martínez-Cobo).
237
Larissa Behrendt, Indigenous Self-Determination: Rethinking the Relationship Between Rights and
Economic Development, 24 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 850, para. 16-17 (2001).
238
HRC, General Comment No. 23, supra note 78, para. 6.2, 7; Endorois v. Kenya, supra note 130, at
para. 196; Maya (Toledo) v. Belize, supra note 44, at para. 96.
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Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing
adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or
individuals requiring such protection . . . shall not be deemed
racial discrimination.
The serious socio-economic problems affecting indigenous
Australians in NT mean special measures are not only justified but urgently
required.239 States parties to ICERD are obliged to take affirmative action to
ensure the adequate development and protection of indigenous peoples
where necessary for the purpose of guaranteeing full enjoyment of their
rights.240 Article 21(2) of UNDRIP further provides that states shall take
special measures where necessary to ensure ongoing improvement in living
conditions. However, Australia’s characterization of the Intervention
provisions as special measures 241 does not satisfy the established
international interpretation.242
Many have observed that if Australia believed NTER amounted to
special measures, there would have been no need to suspend the RDA in the
first place, because Section 8(1) expressly allows special measures as a
legitimate exception to the prohibition against racial discrimination.243 The
federal government acknowledged this inconsistency in taking steps partially
to reinstate the RDA, but continued to rely on special measures as
justification for NTER244–which in turn supports the conclusion that NTER
continued to be characterized by distinctions made on the basis of race,
despite the amendments. An important question is whether provisions that
negatively affect the target group can qualify as special measures.
239

ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38, at Appendix B, para. 3.
ICERD, art. 2(2); Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, supra note 193, at para. 104.
241
NTERA, s133(1).
242
See, e.g., ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38; CERD REPORT 2010, supra note 203; HREOC
SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2007, supra note 164; Vivian, supra note 19; Hunyor, supra note 158; Amnesty
International, supra note 19; Billings, supra notes 141 and 166; Chesterman & Douglas, supra note 2;
Nicholson et al., supra note 19.
243
See, e.g., submissions 97 (Australian Council of Social Service) and 52 (Law Council of
Australia) to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee (2007), available at http://www.aph.
gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-07/nt_emergency/submissions/sublist.htm,
(last visited Apr. 2, 2011); Watson, supra note 143. One exception is s10(3) RDA , which excludes from
“special measures” provisions taking control of Aboriginal land. This would affect some aspects of NTER,
e.g, compulsory leases.
244
E.g., CGA, Future Directions for the Northern Territory Emergency Response – Discussion Paper
(2009), available at http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/indigenous/pubs/nter_reports/future_directions_discussio
n_paper/Pages/default.aspx, last accessed 6 April 2011; WRRRDA Explanatory Memorandum, above n
234. The special measures justification is continued in the new legislation: see Stronger Futures in the
Northern Territory Act 2012 (Cth), ss 7, 33, 37; CGA, House of Representatives, Stronger Futures in the
Northern Territory Bill (Cth) Explanatory Memorandum, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/legis/cth/bill_em/sfitntb2011536/memo_0.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=stronger%2
0futures, (last accessed Jan. 22, 2012).
240
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Internationally, the position is unambiguous. The language of ICERD
and UNDRIP implies preferential treatment of the targeted group, not
treatment that limits or infringes rights.245 ILO Convention 169 puts this
beyond doubt in the indigenous context,246 providing that special measures
shall not be contrary to the freely-expressed wishes of the peoples
concerned, and that special measures shall not prejudice the enjoyment,
without discrimination, of other rights.247
In Australia, however, the question is not settled.248 Differences in
judicial interpretation 249 have blurred the boundaries between positive
measures that benefit disadvantaged groups, and measures that take benefits
away because it is “good for them.”250 This shift seems to indicate a return
to paternalistic notions familiar to indigenous Australians, 251 and raises
concerns that Australia’s use of special measures might harm rather than
benefit the most vulnerable groups. From an international legal perspective,
Australia is bound to give effect to the prevailing interpretation under
international law; domestic law cannot be an excuse for violating
international obligations.252
The CERD has clarified the test for special measures as follows:
Special measures should be appropriate to the situation to be
remedied, be legitimate, necessary in a democratic society,
respect the principles of fairness and proportionality, and be
temporary. ... States parties should ensure that special measures
are designed and implemented on the basis of prior consultation
245

ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38.
Australia has not ratified ILO Convention 169, but see supra, note 29.
247
ILO Convention 169, art. 4(3).
248
Vivian, supra note 19; Hunyor, supra note 158; HREOC Social Justice Report 2007, supra
note 164.
249
See, e.g., Gerhardy v Brown [1985] HCA 11 (Austl.); Vanstone v Clark (2005) 147 FCR 299
(Austl.); Bropho v WA [2007] FCA 519 (Austl.); Bropho v WA [2008] FCAFC 100 (Austl.); Aurukun
Shire Council and Anor v CEO Office of Liquor Gaming and Racing in the Department of Treasury [2010]
QCA 37 (Austl.); Morton v Queensland Police Service [2010] QCA 160 (Austl.); Maloney v Queensland
Police Service [2011] QDC 139 (Austl.).
250
See Hunyor, supra note 158, at 63.
251
See, e.g., HREOC, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INQUIRY INTO THE SEPARATION OF ABORIGINAL
AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER CHILDREN FROM THEIR FAMILIES, BRINGING THEM HOME (1997), available
at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/pdf/social_justice /bringing_them_home_report.pdfa; Billings, supra note 166,
at 181-82; Dodson & Strelein, supra note 2; Sutton, supra note 166; Anthony, supra note 166; Cobb, supra
note 30; Billings, supra note 141; Megan Davis, A Culture of Disrespect: Indigenous Peoples and
Australian Public Institutions, 8 U. TECH. SYDNEY L. REV. 135 (2006).
252
This principle is enshrined in VCLT, art 27, and the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art 32, and it is an established rule of customary law: Pulp Mills on the
River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, para. 121; See also ANAYA REPORT
2010, supra note 38, at Appendix B, para. 20.
246
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with affected communities and the active participation of such
communities.253
Taking “the situation to be remedied” in CERD’s test to be “the child
abuse problem in Aboriginal communities” as the primary trigger for the
Intervention, it is difficult to see how measures like blanket income
management were appropriate, legitimate, and necessary remedies.254 The
objective of child protection is certainly worthy, but the relationship between
the objective and the approach was so tenuous as to lead to skepticism about
the motivations behind NTER.255
As for fairness and proportionality, income management was applied
compulsorily, with no right of external review, on the basis of physical
presence in certain areas distinguished by race–not on the basis of, for
example, a given welfare recipient’s personal decision to participate
voluntarily in income management, or a proven inability to manage his or
her finances coupled with a request for assistance, or a demonstrated
problem of child abuse, neglect, alcoholism or gambling in any individual
case. Although the 2009 and 2010 amendments made some attempt to
change this, by removing references to race and providing for appeals and
exemptions, it is still the case that the income management regime continues
disproportionately to target Aboriginal people.256
The blanket income management system represents discrimination
that is indiscriminate: it contravenes Article 9 of UNDRIP, discriminating
against individuals within the group based on racist generalizations about the
group as a whole. It has been described as equating Aboriginality with a
lack of capacity and assuming that all Aboriginal people are irresponsible,
“feckless squanderers.”257 This stigmatization arguably violates Article 15
of UNDRIP. It contributes to a focus on the “unworthiness” of the people
being targeted, instead of the problems to be addressed.258
Thus NTER income management measures did not respect the
principles of fairness or proportionality in terms of the CERD requirements.
253

Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD], General Recommendation No
XXXII, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/32, para. 16, 18 (Sept. 24, 2009).
254
See discussion in Anaya Report 2010, supra note 38; Hunyor, supra note 158.
255
See, e.g., Martiniello, supra note 2; Howard-Wagner, supra note 2; SENATE COMM. REPORT 2007,
supra note 9, at 49-60, 51 (Andrew Bartlett, Queensland Democrat, Senator, minority report); Watson,
supra note 143; Billings, supra note 166; Melinda Hinkson, Introduction: In the Name of the Child, in
Altman & Hinkson (eds.), supra note 162, at 1-12; Pat Turner & Nicole Watson, The Trojan Horse, in
Altman & Hinkson (eds.), supra note 162, at 205-12.
256
ALASTAIR NICHOLSON ET AL., LISTENING BUT NOT HEARING: A RESPONSE TO NTER STRONGER
FUTURES CONSULTATIONS JUNE TO AUGUST 2011, 8 (2011).
257
Sutton, supra note 166. See also Billings, supra note 141; Anthony, supra note 166.
258
Chesterman & Douglas, supra note 2, at 82; Billings, supra note 141, at 37.
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Nor can the measures be described as temporary; the initial twelve-month
period of compulsory income management was extended, despite the lack of
clear evidence on whether it was meeting its objectives,259 and despite the
recommendations of NTER Review Board.260 Income management has now
been extended yet again, although in modified form, in connection with the
Stronger Futures package. 261 As for consultation and participation,
identified as crucial in the CERD test,262 the discussion above has shown
that no efforts were made to consult with Aboriginal peoples about NTER
before it was launched, and consultations about the redesign took place after
the government had already decided to continue and extend income
management.
The effect on those outside the affected group is another relevant
factor in assessing special measures. 263 This is related to the temporal
criterion: special measures must not be allowed to create unfair
discrimination against those outside the group receiving preferential
treatment.264 In NTER context, however, the effect was the opposite–those
outside the group receiving ‘preferential’ treatment did not want to be a part
of it. Representatives of the refugee community expressed grave concern at
the possibility that newly-arrived refugees would fall within the income
management regime following the 2010 amendments broadening its
scope. 265 The fact that the special treatment is not desirable to people
outside the affected group reinforces the argument that these were not
special measures within the ordinary use of the term.
In summary, Australia’s reliance on “special measures” to justify the
racial distinction in NTER was not valid under international law. 266
259
See CIRCA REPORT 2009, supra note 183; AUS. INST. OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, REPORT ON THE
EVALUATION OF INCOME MANAGEMENT IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORY (2009), available at
http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/about/publicationsarticles/research/occasional/Documents/op34/OP34.pdf
[hereinafter AIHW REPORT]; HREOC Submission 2010, supra note 231.
260
REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra note 24.
261
Social Security Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (Cth) (Austl.). A proposal to delete the schedule
failed. See Stronger Futures Senate Hansard 2012, supra note 183, at 109-16.
262
See also Gerhardy v Brown [1985] HCA 11 (Austl.); Hunyor, supra note 158.
263
See Gillian Triggs, The Rights of Peoples and Individual Rights: Conflict or Harmony?, in
Brownlie, supra note 1, at 141-57.
264
Gerhardy v Brown [1985] HCA 11, para. 38 (per Brennan J) (Austl.).
265
See supra, entire note 231; Refugee Council of Australia, Letter to Dr. Jeff Harmer, Secretary,
Department of Families, Housing, Community Services, and Indigenous Affairs (“FAHCSIA”) (Sept. 7,
2010), available at http://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/docs/89current/100907_FAHCSIA_income_ mgt.pdf.
266
It is unlikely to be challenged domestically, however, given the obstacles, especially, for example,
especially Judge Kirby’s dissent. See Wurridjal v Australia [2009] HCA 2,); McIntyre, supra note 159;
Hilary Charlesworth, The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2004 Term, 28 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 1,
2 (2005). See also Steiner, Alston & Goodman, supra note 193, 913-14 (on Australia’s indifference to
HRC recommendations following individual complaints under the ICCPR Protocol I process).

290

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 22 NO. 2

Amnesty International described it as a travesty that demeans the concept for
The example of compulsory income
short-term political gain. 267
management does not satisfy the CERD requirements, and there is not
enough concrete evidence to say it is ensuring ongoing improvement in
living conditions, in terms of Article 21(2) of UNDRIP.268
Australia’s assertion that the Intervention could be justified on the
grounds of “legitimate differential treatment” that does not need to meet the
special measures test was equally dubious. 269 As a general principle,
treatment that limits rights is only ever justified if it is proportionate to and
necessary for the achievement of a legitimate aim; 270 it must have a
reasonable and objective justification, and remain consistent with other
rights.271 NTER failed on all counts.272
In launching the Intervention, Australia failed to implement the
standards of non-discrimination that are recognized in UNDRIP as integral
to indigenous peoples’ enjoyment of their rights. Instead of adopting a
progressive model of equality, partnership, and respect in tackling the
problem of indigenous disadvantage, as urged by Little Children Are Sacred,
NTER reflects paternalistic attitudes reminiscent of the colonial era. This
initial approach has been severely detrimental to the ongoing success of the
Intervention measures, despite attempts to improve it since 2007.
The right to freedom from discrimination, the first essential
foundation for self-determination, was wholly lacking. The next section will
examine the second foundation: the right to meaningful participation in
decision-making.

267

Amnesty International, supra note 19.
THE AIHW REPORT, supra entire note 259, and NTER Evaluation Report 2011 provided evidence
to suggest that income management was having positive results for a number of participants, but
acknowledged that several limitations in the research such as small sample sizes, nature of the surveys
undertaken, and the lack of a comparison group or historical data meant that the overall evidence of
effectiveness was not strong. For corroboration of the claim that there is inadequate reliable data on
whether or not income management is effective for achieving its stated goals, see Luke Buckmaster &
Carol Ey, Is income management working? (Parliament of Australia, Background Note, June 5, 2012),
available
at
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_
Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/2011-2012/IncomeManagement (last visited July 8, 2012).
269
ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38, at Appendix B, para. 55.
270
Handyside v. U.K., 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 737 (ECHR) (1976); Endorois v. Kenya, supra note 130, at
para. 214.
271
Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, HRC, UN Doc A/36/40 para. 15 (1981); Dann v. United States, supra
note 44.
272
Vivian, supra note 19.
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C.

The Right to Participation

1.

International Law

291

Indigenous peoples’ right to participation is a core principle and right
under international human rights law. 273 In 1997, CERD urged states to
“ensure that members of indigenous peoples have equal rights in respect of
effective participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to
their rights and interests are taken without their informed consent.”274
The right to participation is emphasized repeatedly in UNDRIP, as
discussed above in the analysis of the meaning of self-determination.
Articles 3-5, 18, 19 and 23 are of particular importance. Promoting full and
effective participation by indigenous peoples is one of the goals in the
program of action for the Second Decade of the World’s Indigenous People
(2005-2015),275 and the principles of participation and consultation underpin
the recommendations of each session of the United Nations Permanent
Forum on Indigenous Issues (“UNPFII”).276
At the international level, the inclusive procedure adopted by the
relevant UN bodies during the drafting of UNDRIP recognized the
importance of involving indigenous peoples themselves in creating the
regime that is being developed to protect their rights and interests.277 This
shift away from the typically state-centered creation of international law has
blazed the trail for significantly increased indigenous participation at the
international level.278 The formation, composition and ongoing mandate of
UNPFII will help ensure that that participation continues.279 In Tennant’s
words, “participation is now the hinge on which the whole political field of
indigenous peoples and international institutions turns.”280
273
Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Progress Report on the Study on
Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-Making, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/EMRIP/2010/2
(May 17, 2010) [hereinafter EMRIP Report].
274
CERD, General Recommendation No XXIII on Indigenous Peoples (Aug. 18, 1997), U.N. Doc.
A/52/18, Annex V, para. 4(d). See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 23, supra note 78,
at para. 7.
275
U.S. General Assembly, Draft Programme of Action for the Second International Decade of the
World’s Indigenous People, U.N. Doc. A/60/270 (Aug. 18, 2005).
276
See UNPFII, ENGAGING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN GOVERNANCE PROCESSES: INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT (Aug. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/ documents/engagement_background_en.pdf, para. 11.
277
See, e.g., Daes, supra note 33; Eide, supra note 4.
278
See UNDRIP, art. 41; Lindroth, supra note 39, at 242; Daes, supra note 33, at 10; U.N. InterAgency Support Group on Indigenous Issues, UN Development Group Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’
Issues (2009), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/ UNDG_guidelines_EN.pdf
[hereinafter UNDG Guidelines]. Compare Otto, supra note 2, at 102.
279
See Lindroth, supra note 39.
280
Tennant, supra note 10, at 4 (although he warns against treating institutional participation as an
end in itself).
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At the national level, UNDRIP distinguishes between state-wide
“external” participation and local “internal” participation. 281 External
participation reflects the right to participation in the conduct of public affairs
enshrined in Article 25 of ICCPR,282 often described as a right to political
participation, which is arguably emerging as a norm of customary law.283 It
is significant that UNDRIP specifically recognizes political participation as a
group right, capable of exercise by indigenous peoples collectively,284 where
previously it was only recognized as an individual right. 285 Accordingly,
there will be a need to strengthen indigenous peoples’ own representative
institutions.286
It need hardly be reiterated that rights of external, political
participation–including the right to vote and the emerging right to
democratic governance–are a vital component of self-determination for any
people. But internal participation is the “extra dimension” of participation
that provides the essential element of empowerment in UNDRIP:
meaningful participation in decision-making about indigenous peoples’ local
affairs and interests.287 The right to participation embodied in UNDRIP is
broader than simply political participation, requiring both the internal and
external elements of participation combined, as fundamental prerequisites
for self-determination.288
Three points support this argument. First, confining the label of
participation to political concepts pushes indigenous peoples towards
traditionally Western decision-making processes and institutions, and thus

281

EMRIP Report, supra note 273, at 3.
UNDRIP art. 5; UDHR art. 21; ILO Convention 169 arts. 6, 7.
283
See, e.g., Gregory Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT’L
L. 539 (1992); Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46
(1992); Maia Campbell, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Political Participation and the Case of
YATAMA v. Nicaragua, 24 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 499 (2007).
284
UNDRIP, art. 5.
285
Marshall v. Canada, HRC, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/205/l986 (1991); Diergaardt v Namibia, para.
10.8 (compare the separate opinion by Judge Scheinin).
286
XANTHAKI, supra note 29, at 111; Tennant, supra note 10.
287
The word “meaningful” does not appear in UNDRIP, nor does “effective,” but the notion is
implicit in the context of UNDRIP–otherwise participation could be reduced to token consultations. This
argument is supported by the Declaration on the Right to Development art. 2(3) G.A. Res. 41/128 (Dec. 28,
1986);Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic
Minorities art. 2 G.A. Res. 47/135 (Dec. 8, 1992), art. 2; General Comment No 23, supra note 78; Endorois
v. Kenya, supra note 130, at paras. 281-283; YATAMA v. Nicaragua, supra note 130, at para. 225;
Saramaka v. Suriname, supra note 130, paras. 129, 147. See also Myntti, supra note 35, at 122-130.
288
The rights in Article 25 of the ICCPR are related to but distinct from self-determination. HRC,
General Comment No 25: Article 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) 167, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (1996).
282
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reduces the empowerment to participate as they see fit, including through
their own institutions and structures of governance.289
Second, focusing solely on the political sphere sidelines non-political
decision-making processes that may be important for indigenous peoples, for
example, when exercising their socio-economic and cultural rights under
UNDRIP. Such decisions need to be made at the most local level possible in
order to be effective.290 The interpretation of the right to participation as an
integral part of self-determination needs to be broad enough to encompass
decision-making in all spheres of public life, not just political decisions.291
Third, if expressed solely in political terms, the right to participation
loses much of its value and power for indigenous peoples. Individual
indigenous persons are guaranteed participation in political processes by
Article 25 of ICCPR. However, it is clear from the statistics and
jurisprudence that indigenous peoples in many states with functioning
democracies and ostensibly representative governments, including Australia,
do not always enjoy any effective right of participation in the decisions that
affect their lives. 292 UNDRIP recognizes that a more direct level of
participation is required, in a way that is meaningful for indigenous peoples,
if they are to have an effective role in controlling their futures.293 This is an
area where special measures may be necessary.294
At its lowest level, the right to participation in decision-making
corresponds to a basic duty on states to consult with indigenous peoples
before making decisions about issues that affect their interests. 295 States
parties to ILO Convention 169 are already bound by this duty,296 and the ILA
has described it as a rule of customary law.297 Regional jurisprudence shows
289
YATAMA v. Nicaragua, supra note 130; Mary Ellen Turpel, Indigenous Peoples' Rights of
Political Participation and Self-Determination: Recent International Legal Developments and the
Continuing Struggle for Recognition, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 579 (1992).
290
Anaya (1993), supra note 35, at 152.
291
This argument is supported by the Nuuk Conclusions and Recommendations on Indigenous
Autonomy and Self-Government (1991), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/42.
292
Martínez-Cobo Report 1983, supra note 37; EMRIP Report, supra note 273; Saramaka v.
Suriname, supra note 130; Endorois v. Kenya, supra note 130; Maya (Toledo) v. Belize, supra note 44;
Diergaardt v Namibia, No. 760/1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997 (2000) (Judge Scheinin
concurring).
293
YATAMA v. Nicaragua, supra note 130, at para. 201, 207; id. at para. 30-31 (García-Ramírez
concurrence); EMRIP Report, supra note 273, at para. 12; HRC, General Comment No. 23, supra note 77,
at para. 7.
294
Quane, supra note 31, at 283; Campbell, supra note 283; Turpel, supra note 289.
295
See, e.g., UNDRIP at arts. 15(2), 17(2), 30, 36, 38; CERD, General Recommendation No XXIII,
supra note 274; Martínez-Cobo Report 1983, supra note 37; Saramaka v. Suriname, supra note 130; Dann
v. United States, supra note 44.
296
International Labor Organization (“ILO”), Convention No. 169 art. 6(2) (1989).
297
International Law Association Report, supra note 3, at 852.
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that it requires good faith negotiations, through culturally appropriate
procedures, with the object of achieving agreement. 298 This objective
matches the higher standard expressed in some of UNDRIP’s provisions.299
The threshold is one of constant two-way communication from an early
stage in the planning of any initiative.300 The duty is not discharged merely
by presenting information once the decision has been made, 301 or when
approval is required.302 In some circumstances, the duty of consultation will
not be discharged unless there is actual consent.303
At its highest level (short of full secession and independence), the
right to participation amounts to internal autonomy or self-government as
provided in Article 4 of UNDRIP.304 However, that option is unlikely to be
feasible or desirable for all indigenous peoples, particularly small
communities without the resources, infrastructure and population to sustain
it 305 –and even for those that do have the potential for full autonomous
government, it will take time to develop that capacity. Meaningful
participation in decision-making is the first essential step towards that end, if
that is the goal; otherwise, it is an empowering goal in itself.
Thus an expansive interpretation of the concept of participation
underpinning self-determination sees bare consultation and full autonomy as
different points along a continuum. The right necessarily involves a choice
for indigenous peoples about the desired form and degree of participation
along that scale.306 Of course, indigenous peoples’ right to participation is
not absolute. It is clear it will be tempered by other practical and political
considerations within the state, not least of which will be the rights of other

298
Maya (Toledo) v Belize, supra note 44; Saramaka v. Suriname supra note 130; Endorois v Kenya,
supra note 130, at para. 289; Dann v. United States, supra note 44, at para. 165. See Nuclear Tests
(Australia v. France) 1974 I.C.J. 268, para. 46 (Dec. 20) and Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) 1974
I.C.J. 473, para. 49 (Dec. 20) (stating the customary law principle of good faith (reflected in article 26 of
VCLT) is “[o]ne of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations,
whatever their source”). See also Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of
April 20, 2010, paras. 145-46.
299
See, e.g., UNDRIP at arts. 19, 32.
300
Saramaka v. Suriname, supra note 130; Endorois v. Kenya, supra note 130, at para. 289.
301
Dann v. United States, supra note 44, at para. 281; Wurridjal v Australia, [2009] HCA 2 (per
Judge Kirby’s dissent).
302
Saramaka v. Suriname, supra note 130, at para. 133.
303
Id., at para. 134; UNDRIP arts. 10, 29.
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For a typology of UNDRIP’s provisions on participation, see Quane, supra note 31, at 275-84. [
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Eide, supra note 4, at 199.
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MARTÍNEZ-COBO REPORT 1983, supra note 38.
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citizens and groups, 307 and may be subject to reasonable restrictions
according to the usual standards for any limitation on rights.308
The important point is that UNDRIP recognizes that bare political or
“external” participation has not been enough to ensure the full enjoyment by
indigenous peoples of all their rights. The extra element of “internal”
participation is also required, and it is these two forms of participation in
combination that join with non-discrimination to create the foundations of
indigenous self-determination.
2.

Participation in NTER

The very language of the Intervention signals that it was imposed
from outside, rather than having its genesis within the communities it
purported to serve. Despite the clear exhortations of Little Children Are
Sacred, there was no process of consultation at all before the Intervention
was launched–in some cases there was not even time for notification before
police and military began arriving in the communities.309 Nearly 500 pages
of draft legislation were rushed through Parliament with such haste that there
was no time for genuine public debate.310 Instead, Aboriginal peoples in NT
were simply presented with a “legislative fait accompli.”311
It is obvious from Little Children Are Sacred that the Board saw
empowerment and participation as the way forward for indigenous
communities in NT,312 and that community members consulted by the Board
strongly supported the methods that they used. 313 The emphasis by both
sides on the need for genuine consultation and engagement mirrors the
message from the international community at the time, with UNDRIP
adopted by the G.A. just a month after NTER was launched.
However, Australia prioritized urgency at the expense of all else,
arguing that “action cannot be delayed by concerns that it is ‘culturally
307

See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 2; Kingsbury, supra note 79; Vivian, supra note 19; Quane, supra

note 31.
308

Mahuika v. New Zealand, supra note 70; Marshall v. Canada Tribunal, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/43/D/205/l986 (Dec. 3, 1991), at para. 5.4-5.5.
309
Vivian, supra note 70, at 13.
310
Numerous individuals and organizations expressed serious concern about this (and many other
aspects of the Intervention) to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee.
See
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-07/nt_emergency/sub
missions/sublist.htm; Committee Hansard 2007, supra note 160; Bartlett, supra note 255. See also
COERCIVE RECONCILIATION, supra note 162.
311
Wurridjal v Australia [2009] HCA 2, at para. 234 (per Judge Kirby’s dissent).
312
See Little Children Are Sacred, supra note 14, at 52 (yet even the report’s authors were not
consulted before the Intervention legislation was drafted). See Committee Hansard 2007, supra note 160,
at 13.
313
The report quotes one Warlpiri elder as saying “We never have meetings like this. If we have
more meetings like this we will have more answers.” Little Children Are Sacred, supra note 14, at 52.
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inappropriate.’” 314 The language of “crisis” and “emergency” assisted to
stifle debate and prevent scrutiny of the proposed measures, with those
arguing for more careful consideration branded as tolerating child abuse.315
The sudden, non-consultative manner of implementing a large number of
major changes at once, and strong negative reactions to compulsory income
management in particular, have contributed to a generalized and ongoing
lack of engagement with measures which might otherwise have been well
received. 316 NTER approach undermined its own effectiveness from the
outset by generating a widespread sense of betrayal, anger and loss of trust
in the communities it purported to serve.317
The complete lack of consultation before the Intervention was
launched violated the standards of internal participation enshrined in
UNDRIP, including in Articles 18,318 19,319 and 23.320
Following severe criticism about the lack of participation,321 Australia
acknowledged that consultations had been deficient, and from June to
August 2009 it undertook a wide-reaching program of consultations on the
“redesign” of the key NTER measures.322 This was undoubtedly a step in
314

Howard, supra note 159.
See generally Bartlett, supra note 255; Howard-Wagner, supra note 2; Billings, supra note 141;
Boyd Hunter, Conspicuous Compassion and Wicked Problems: The Howard Government’s National
Emergency in Indigenous Affairs, 14 AGENDA 35 (2007); Raimond Gaita, The Moral Force of
Reconciliation, in COERCIVE RECONCILIATION, supra note 162, at 295-306.
316
NTER Evaluation Report 2011, supra note 171, at 5, 11-14, 363.
317
REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra note 24, at 8.
318
UNDRIP art. 18 provides: “Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in
matters which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with
their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making
institutions.”
319
Id. at art. 19 (providing: “States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous
peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and
informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect
them.”).
320
Id. at art. 23 (providing: “Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities
and strategies for exercising their right to development. In particular, indigenous peoples have the right to
be actively involved in developing and determining health, housing and other economic and social
programmes affecting them and, as far as possible, to administer such programmes through their own
institutions.”).
321
See, e.g., HREOC SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2007, supra note 164; REVIEW BOARD REPORT, supra
note 24; ANAYA REPORT 2008, supra note 30; Special Rapporteur Anaya, Summary of Cases Transmitted
to Governments and Replies Received, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/9/Add.1 (Aug. 15, 2008); ICERD Request,
supra note 176; CERD Urgent Actions Letters, supra note 203; CIRCA REPORT 2009, supra note 183;
AIHW REPORT, supra note 259.
322
See Future Directions, supra note 244; CGA, Policy Statement: Landmark Reform to the Welfare
System, Reinstatement of the Racial Discrimination Act, and Strengthening of the Northern Territory
Emergency Response (November 2009), available at http://www.fahcsia. gov.au/sa/indigenous/pubs/
nter_reports/policy_state ment_nter/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2011) [hereinafter CGA Policy
Statement]; CGA, REPORT ON NTER REDESIGN CONSULTATIONS (2009), available at
315

MARCH 2013

UNDRIP AND THE INTERVENTION

297

the right direction, but the consultation efforts have been criticized for
having a predetermined outcome,323 failing to involve Aboriginal people in
the design and implementation of the consultations themselves, and failing
adequately to explain complex legal concepts or use interpreters. 324 The
2009 consultations were aimed at defining provisions more clearly as special
measures, rather than ensuring they were not racially discriminatory. 325
They sought to maintain and strengthen core NTER measures, for example
compulsory income management, despite calls for it to be abolished, or at
least significantly amended so that it only applied to voluntary participants
or those with a genuine need for assistance identified by their community.326
All of this suggests the consultations did not meet the basic criteria for the
duty to consult outlined above. The process was more about obtaining some
measure of community approval of decisions that had already been made,
instead of being genuinely directed towards achieving agreement with
indigenous peoples, as a two-way process of good faith, about how to
develop measures that would affect their ongoing rights.
The Select Committee on Regional and Remote Indigenous
Communities, appointed to evaluate the effectiveness of NTER measures
between 2008-2010, reported in 2009 that it had not received any evidence
to indicate the experience of people in NTER communities had improved in
terms of consultation and engagement, and observed that the federal
government’s report on the adequacy of the consultations was contradicted
by the independent report named Will They Be Heard? that was launched the
same day.327 Research on “engagement” included as part of the 2011 NTER
Evaluation Report highlighted serious deficiencies in important areas related
to participation in decision-making, including inadequate use of interpreters,
http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/indigenous/pubs/nter_reports/Pages/report_nter_redesign_
consultations.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2011) [hereinafter CGA 2009 REPORT].
323
For example, the government had already decided to keep the compulsory income management
regime: the only alternative open for discussion was whether to incorporate mechanisms for people to
prove they deserved an exemption.
324
Nicholson et al., supra note 19; CIRCA REPORT 2009, supra note 183; Nicholson, supra note 232;
Vivian, supra note 19; McIntyre, supra note 159, at 109. Besides the provisions on participation, the
failure to use interpreters also breaches UNDRIP, art. 13(2).
325
AUSTRALIAN AND NORTHERN TERRITORY GOVERNMENTS, RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF NTER
REVIEW BOARD (2008), available at http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/indigenous/pubs/nter_reports/
response_to_reportNT ER/Pages/default.aspx, (last visited Apr. 6, 2011); CGA Policy Statement, supra
note 322; HREOC Submission 2010, supra note 231; WRRRDA Explanatory Memorandum, supra
note 234.
326
Nicholson et al., supra note 19 (providing the transcripts of consultations and discussions).
327
CGA, THIRD REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL AND REMOTE INDIGENOUS
COMMUNITIES (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/
Senate_Committees?url=indig_ctte/reports/index.htm (last visited July 8, 2012), para. 3.77. See Nicholson
et al., supra note 19 for the Will They Be Heard? Report.
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failure to tailor engagement processes to local cultures, inadequate respect
for the need for slower timeframes to allow for genuine consultation with
communities, and a need to facilitate increased capacity for local governance
by using existing structures within communities.328 At the other end of the
spectrum, there is also evidence that in some cases communities have felt
overwhelmed by too many consultations on certain issues, with high
numbers of visits from government officials causing a burden to
communities. 329 These failings point to an ongoing need for improved
Aboriginal engagement and participation in the actual design and
implementation of consultation processes, so that they are relevant,
constructive, and meaningful.
In summary, the level of indigenous participation in decision-making
in NT during the Intervention fell well below the aspirations of consensus,
cooperation, and consent in UNDRIP, with breaches of important provisions
including Articles 18, 19, and 23. The redesign consultations were an
improvement on no consultations at all, but they did not live up to the
standards embodied in UNDRIP and did little to provide Aboriginal people
with meaningful opportunities to participate in decisions affecting their
rights. The focus here is on evolving standards of so-called internal
participation, not voting rights,330 but it is arguable that even the established
ICCPR right to political participation has had no true effect for those
targeted by the Intervention–their voices were not heard.
Any possibility of autonomy and self-government was completely out
of the question under the paternalistic approach taken in NTER. The initial
absence of consultation and the flaws in the redesign process have
undermined ongoing decision-making processes and local governance in
communities, which perpetuates the popular stigmatization of Aboriginal
people as unable to help themselves. 331 Although UNDRIP’s enhanced
standards of internal participation may not yet be binding on Australia as a
matter of international law,332 similar objectives are already recognized in

328

NTER EVALUATION REPORT 2011, supra note 171, at 136-140.
Id. at 5, 17-18, 152-53.
Even those voting rights which have come were received only relatively recently: Aboriginal
people did not have a universal right to vote until 1962, and voting was not compulsory (as for other
Australians) until 1982–for a long time it was illegal to encourage Aboriginal people to vote. See George
Williams, Race and the Australian Constitution: From Federation to Reconciliation, 38 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 643, 651-52 (2000); Murphy, supra note 2.
331
ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38, at para. 59 and Appendix B, para. 3; Howard-Wagner, supra
note 2; Still Paying the Price for Benign Intentions?, supra note 141; Social Welfare Experiments in
Australia, supra note 166.
332
Contrast ILA Report, supra note 3, at 852 for the view that the duty to consult is customary law.
329
330
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Australian legislation, 333 and it should be recalled that CERD had been
urging ICERD states parties to adhere to such standards for at least ten years
before UNDRIP was adopted.334
D.

Conclusion

Starting from the understanding that self-determination is about a
people’s empowerment to control its own affairs, it is clear from the
foregoing analysis that the original NTER violated the right to selfdetermination recognized in UNDRIP by failing to uphold the basic norms
that underpin it: meaningful participation in decision-making and the right to
freedom from discrimination.335 It did not even measure up to the limited
interpretation of self-determination that Australia endorsed when it
announced its support for UNDRIP in 2009,336 let alone the high standard it
supported during earlier phases of the UNDRIP drafting process. 337 The
Little Children Are Sacred report which triggered the Intervention identified
the disempowerment of Aboriginal men and women as a matter requiring
urgent attention, 338 but Australia’s response to that report disempowered
them further still.
The Intervention was missing the crucial element of empowerment
from its inception. Attempts to patch it up through partial reinstatement of
the RDA and flawed consultations on the redesign were inadequate to
reverse that effect as NTER transitioned into the “development” phase
333

The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005 (Cth), s 3 provides:
The objects of this Act are, in recognition of the past dispossession and dispersal of the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and their present disadvantaged position in
Australian society:
(a) to ensure maximum participation of Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders in
the formulation and implementation of government policies that affect them;
(b) to promote the development of self-management and self-sufficiency among
Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders;
(c) to further the economic, social and cultural development of Aboriginal persons and
Torres Strait Islanders; and
(d) to ensure co-ordination in the formulation and implementation of policies affecting
Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders by the Commonwealth, State, Territory
and local governments, without detracting from the responsibilities of State, Territory and
local governments to provide services to their Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
residents.
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See supra, text accompanying note 274.
ANAYA REPORT 2010, supra note 38, at para.16; McIntyre, supra note 159, at 109; CERD REPORT
2010, supra note 203.
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Macklin, supra note 97.
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See, e.g., Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 93; Barsh, supra note 26; Sanders, supra
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administered under the Closing the Gap in the Northern Territory National
Partnership Agreement (“NTNPA”).339 The declaration of an ‘emergency’
was decades overdue, and welcome for the reason that it triggered
unprecedented investment in service provision and infrastructure for
indigenous communities–but Australia crashed the ambulance.340 Even the
Intervention’s strongest supporters could hardly argue that any gains have
been made specifically because the government chose to take a
discriminatory and paternalistic approach, and that such an approach was
necessary for that progress to be realized; the evidence to the contrary, that
the approach was severely detrimental to the success of individual measures,
is far more compelling.
MOVING ON: STRONGER FUTURES?

IV.

Where is all that self-determination, where has all that yäku
(name) gone. You can change names [to Stronger Futures] to
convince [us that things are better] but you are still following
the same [track].341
It is one thing to pick apart the 2007 NTER as a clear failure to
respect and foster indigenous self-determination, but it must be
acknowledged that the Intervention has changed shape over its lifetime,342
and the efforts to improve participation and reinstate the RDA, albeit far
from perfect in their execution, represent a positive sign that Australia has
attempted to respond to some of the criticism of its original methodology.
The million-dollar–or rather, 3.4 billion dollar 343 –question is whether
Australia has truly learned from the serious backlash provoked by NTER
and is prepared to make genuine efforts to align ongoing policies and
legislative processes with the spirit of empowerment in UNDRIP.
With the commencement of the Stronger Futures consultations in June
2011, there appeared to be cause for optimism. It was another chance to
start again. Shifts in the language used by government as it has moved
339

For an outline of the transition, see NTER EVALUATION REPORT 2011, supra note 171, at 71-74.
Kay Boulden & John Morton, Don’t Crash the Ambulance, in COERCIVE RECONCILIATION, supra
note 162, at 163-170.
341
Statement by Djuŋadjuŋa Yunupiŋu, Dalkarramirr for the Gumatj Nation, Apr. 24, 2012 (spoken
in English and Yolŋu Matha and attached as Appendix 1 to Yolngu Nations Assembly), available at
http://stoptheintervention.org/uploads/files_to_download/ Stronger-Futures/Yolngu-Statement-2-5-12.pdf.
342
For a summary of how the welfare reforms have evolved over the life of NTER, see NTER
EVALUATION REPORT 2011, supra note 171, at Appendix 9.A.
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This is the amount pledged for the Stronger Futures legislation (separate from income
management) over the next ten years. See Jenny Macklin MP, Press Conference, June 29, 2012, available
at http://www.jennymacklin.fahcsia.gov.au/node/1977 (last visited 11 July 11, 2012).
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beyond the emergency phase of NTER into the development phase under the
NTNPA have suggested Australia is keen to “reset the relationship” with
indigenous peoples, and that it recognizes the importance of improving its
approach to engagement, collaboration and partnership.344 It is particularly
significant that the Prime Minister has acknowledged the role that decades of
under-investment in infrastructure and basic services for Aboriginal people
have played in the entrenched disadvantage experienced today,345 and it is
encouraging that both the federal and NT governments have committed to
ongoing investment and funding for increased services in communities,
including parenting support, financial literacy services, substance abuse
prevention, health, and education services.
The mere fact Australia was undertaking consultations on Stronger
Futures was already a vast improvement on the early approach of NTER,
and the large scale of the consultations (around 450 meetings across 100
communities, town camps and major towns) suggested an admirable attempt
to ascertain the views of a wide range of different people. 346 The
government commissioned an independent monitor to report on whether or
not consultations were conducted in accordance with the government’s
consultation and communication strategies and were “open, fair and
accountable.” The report concluded that within its limited terms of
reference those objectives had been satisfied, and that there were some
practical improvements in the conduct of the meetings as compared to the
2009 redesign consultations.347
Despite these improvements, however, there remains serious cause for
concern that the Stronger Futures consultations were inadequate, in terms of
the standards set forth in UNDRIP. Transcripts of the consultations
themselves,348 numerous submissions to the Senate inquiry,349 speeches by
344
See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT: DEPT. OF FAMILIES, HOUSING, COMMUNITY SERVICES, &
INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, CLOSING THE GAP: ENGAGEMENT AND PARTNERSHIP WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLE,
available at http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/our-responsibilities/indigenous-australians/programs-services/
closing-the-gap/closing-the-gap-engagement-and-partnership-with-indigenous-people (last visited July 8,
2012); CGA, PRIME MINISTER’S REPORT, supra note 20; CGA, STRONGER FUTURES: POLICY STATEMENT,
supra note 22. See also Northern Territory Government, Submission No. 403 to the Senate Community
Affairs Committee Inquiry into the Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Bill 2011 and
Two Related Bills, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Comm
ittees?url=clac_ctte/strong_future_nt_11/submissions.htm (last visited July 11, 2012).
345
Closing the Gap: Prime Minister’s Report, supra note 20; see also Gaita, supra note 315.
346
See Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Report on Consultations, supra note 22.
347
CULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS RESEARCH CENTRE AUSTRALIA, Report on Stronger Futures
Consultation 2011, 27 (2011), available at www.fahcsia.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2012/
circa_qa.pdf [hereinafter CIRCA Report 2011].
348
For transcripts from a number of consultation meetings, see http://www.concernedaustralians.com.a
u/.
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several senators at the second reading of the bills,350 and public responses
both before and after the legislation was passed 351 contradict the positive
reports from the government, and indicate that there is a substantial amount
of opposition to the new legislation. Again, the point here is not to critique
the content of the new policies, but to examine at this early stage whether the
government’s methodology in developing and implementing Stronger
Futures shows a move away from the mistakes of NTER.
In terms of the quality of consultations, the government’s own review
of NTER had acknowledged that “the timeframes imposed and the decision
to consult after key decisions had already been taken were responsible for
many of the problems in the early stages of NTER.” 352 Yet these same
criticisms, and many others that were familiar from the original NTER and
the redesign consultations, have arisen again in respect of Stronger Futures–
that the consultations operated on “Canberra” timeframes, with inadequate
involvement of Aboriginal people in the planning of consultations, little or
no notice of meetings, and insufficient time for detailed deliberation; that
significant measures like income management were not listed for discussion;
that information about the proposed measures was densely worded and
complex, and provided with insufficient time for communities to give it
proper consideration before the consultations; that there was inadequate use
of interpreters, including a lack of translation of lengthy written materials
349
The Committee received 452 submissions and form letters from approximately 560 individuals.
Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Bill 2011 [Provisions]; Stronger Futures in the Northern
Territory (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2011 [Provisions]; Social Security Legislation
Amendment Bill 2011 [Provisions], SENATE COMMUNITY AFFAIRS LEGISLATION COMMITTEE 1 (Mar. 14,
2012) available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/ Committees/Senate_Committees?
url=clac_ctte/strong_future_nt_11/report/index.htm (last visited July 11, 2012). The submissions are
available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=clac_ctte
/strong_future_nt_11/submissions.htm.
350
Stronger Futures Senate Hansard 2012, supra note 183.
351
See, e.g., Nicholson et al., supra note 256; Stronger Futures Forum Held at Maningrida on 21
February 2012 (Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://vimeo.com/37790315 (last accessed July 6, 2012);
Yolngu Nations Assembly, supra note 341; STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AUSTRALIA’S
FIRST
PEOPLES
TO
UNPFII
(May
2012),
http://nationalcongress.com.au/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/120514UNFinal-Statement.pdf (last visited July 12, 2012); THE STRONGER
FUTURES LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE: ASSESSMENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS, AUSTRALIAN
LAWYERS’ ALLIANCE, June 29, 2012, http://lawyersalliance.com.au/media/File/2_ALA_Statement_of_Non
compliance.pdf [hereinafter “Stronger Futures Assessment”]; Aboriginal Leaders Declare Day of
Mourning, THE AUSTRALIAN, June 27, 2012, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/breakingnews/aboriginal-leaders-declare-day-of-mourning/story-fn3dxity-1226409672043 (last visited July 12,
2012); Stronger Futures Laws Condemned After Passing Senate, ABC NEWS, June 29, 2012,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-06-29/stronger-futures-laws-rushed-through-senate/4100288 (last visited
July 12, 2012). Various resources are also available at the website of the group Concerned Australians,
http://www.concernedaustralians.com.au/.
352
NTER EVALUATION REPORT 2011, supra note 171, at 41.
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into Aboriginal languages; and that the sessions covered so many questions
that there was no possibility of in depth discussion in the time available.353
These concerns and the many strong negative responses to the content
of the legislation itself 354 indicate that the standards of participation in
decision-making and free, prior, informed consent in Articles 18 and 19
UNDRIP have not been met; nor has the consultation process given adequate
effect to the rights of Aboriginal people to be actively involved in the
development and implementation of health, housing, economic and social
programs, in connection with the exercise of their rights to development
according to their own priorities (Article 23).
The inadequacies in the consultation process have important
implications for the government’s assertion that the key measures in the
Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act 2012 amount to special
measures. 355 As discussed above, special measures amount to “positive
discrimination;” they are an exception to the definition of racial
discrimination because they are taken for the sole purpose of advancing the
rights of disadvantaged groups. The special measures justification is not
substantiated in detail in the government’s “Statement on compatibility with
human rights” provided under the new Human Rights (Parliamentary
Scrutiny) Act 2011.356 However, even without delving into an assessment of
the substance of the legislation, the lack of adequate prior consultation is
enough on its own to disqualify these measures as “special measures” in
accordance with the established criteria under international law, 357 that
essential prerequisite being even more important in circumstances where the
measures appear to confer a negative effect rather than a benefit on the target
group.
If they are not genuine special measures, then it is clear that the
Stronger Futures legislation is discriminatory, despite purporting not to
“affect” the operation of RDA.358 It seems that the legislation still operates
on racially discriminatory assumptions–one being that Aboriginal people
353

See Nicholson et al., supra note 256; HREOC Submission 2012, supra note 349; CIRCA REPORT
2011, supra note 347.
354
For numerous submissions to the Senate inquiry, see supra note 349.
355
Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act 2012 (Cth), ss 7, 33, 37 (Austl.); Stronger Futures
in the Northern Territory Bill (Cth) (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/legis/cth/bill_em/sfitntb2011536/memo_0.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=stronger%2
0futures (last visited Jan. 22, 2012).
356
See Stronger Futures Assessment, supra note 351 (responding to the government’s statement).
357
For a more detailed analysis, see Nicholson et al., supra note 256, at 99-101, para. 242-47.
358
Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act 2012 (Cth), s 4A (Austl.). Whether or not this
provision is strong enough to prevent the later act from prevailing over RDA in event of inconsistency
remains to be seen. See supra note 215.
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need centralized government to make decisions for them about matters such
as food choices and alcohol management, and another being that all
Aboriginal cultures across the NT are the same and will benefit from the
blanket imposition of a “one-size-fits-all” approach. Both of these
assumptions were challenged repeatedly during the consultation process, and
it was clear that there is an ongoing perception that the legislation creates
different rules for Aboriginal people as compared to other Australians.359
In the context of the present discussion, the ongoing plans for
extending compulsory income management across Australia are particularly
troubling. The evidence that compulsory income management is an
effective means of addressing disadvantage is limited, with resulting positive
changes reported as “uneven and fragile.” 360 Again, the 2011 NTER
Evaluation had documented the wide-reaching feelings of loss of control and
disempowerment that resulted from the imposition of compulsory income
management, and advocated a new approach that would “encourage local
Indigenous social and cultural ownership” 361 –yet the new legislation not
only continues compulsory income management but extends it to new
categories of people and broadens executive power to roll the regime out
further to new communities across Australia.362
At the time of writing it has only been a matter of days since the new
legislation passed through the Senate, but there have been calls for the new
acts to be subjected to the scrutiny of the new Joint Committee on Human
Rights.363 It is too early to comment on the implementation of the Stronger
Futures initiatives, but the preliminary assessment of Australia’s
methodology through the development phase shows a troubling tendency to
repeat the mistakes of the recent past. Once again, as with NTER, there are
359
See Nicholson et al., supra note 19. See also the website of the group Concerned Australians,
supra note 348, for transcripts of consultation meetings; Stronger Futures Forum Held at Maningrida on
21 February 2012, supra note 351.
360
Buckmaster & Ey, supra note 268. There is some evidence suggesting that NTER welfare reforms
had had some positive effects in making communities feel stronger, more sustainable and safer, particularly
for women and children, but researchers have cautioned against reliance on the data without further
research to counter the limitations of available evidence. See also NTER EVALUATION REPORT 2011, supra
note 171; AIHW REPORT, supra note 259. On the other hand, there is evidence that many current
participants do not understand the purpose of the scheme or why they are on it, that it has not caused them
to change their spending habits or feel safer, and that they feel shame and a loss of dignity when using the
BasicsCard and dealing with income managers. See Women’s Experience of Income Management in the
Northern Territory, supra note 233.
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concerns about a failure to facilitate genuine participation in decisionmaking in line with the standards embodied in UNDRIP, and the continued
reliance on special measures to justify the blanket imposition of top-down
measures is a worrying sign that the move to Stronger Futures has
perpetuated and not cured the discriminatory origins of NTER.
Indeed, there is a real danger that the widely held perception that this
is simply the Intervention being continued under another name will obscure
community perceptions of the Stronger Futures policies; that no matter how
progressive and beneficial they might be on their own terms, or how genuine
the government’s motives are in implementing them, community
engagement will remain on the back foot because they are contaminated by
the distrust and disillusionment engendered by the Intervention. The
paramount importance of genuine and meaningful two-way consultations
with communities cannot be overstated. Consultations are not just a
formality to be ticked off a list, and it is unfortunate that moves to
incorporate the HREOC guidelines for meaningful consultations into the
legislation were not successful.364
V.

SUMMARY AND FINAL OBSERVATIONS

A.

Recapitulation: UNDRIP and Self-Determination

The right to self-determination is now unequivocally recognized as a
right of indigenous peoples. Article 3 UNDRIP explicitly claims for
indigenous peoples what was previously denied them by excluding them
from the meaning of “all peoples” in international law. This provides an
opportunity to unify competing understandings of the right and resolve
inequalities, drawing on established norms while smoothing over historical
areas of contention. This article advocates interpreting self-determination in
a manner specific enough to be capable of useful application in any given
case, but flexible enough to accommodate different circumstances: as the
right of peoples to control their own affairs through meaningful participation
in decision-making and freedom from discrimination.
This fundamental relationship between non-discrimination and
participation on the one hand and the right to self-determination on the other,
exists both in the latter’s traditional form under general international law and
in the indigenous context. The consistent foundation of participation and
non-discrimination shows that indigenous self-determination and traditional
self-determination share the same origins and rationale, and are not as
364
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divergent as some maintain. The scope of self-determination for indigenous
peoples must also be interpreted as equal: there is no reason to restrict it to
internal self-determination, because external self-determination is already
tightly circumscribed for everyone under international law. The alternative
approach that views self-determination as a matter of substance and remedy,
instead of internal and external aspects, supports this argument. Secession
by indigenous peoples is unlikely, but equality in the range of remedies
available is vital, if the international community is genuine in its acceptance
of indigenous peoples as “peoples.”
This article has argued that UNDRIP supplements the long-established
foundations of self-determination by adding a crucial element of
empowerment to the indigenous rights framework, particularly through its
enhanced standards of internal participation and informed consent that
complement and transcend established norms of political participation. The
shift towards empowerment is inherent in the hard-won confirmation, after
decades of battling over the “s,” 365 that indigenous peoples are indeed
“peoples,” equal to “all peoples,” and entitled to the same rights. UNDRIP
recognizes that indigenous peoples may need preferential treatment in some
circumstances–not to live better than anyone else, but merely so they can
“‘live like’ everyone else.”366 It strengthens the indigenous rights framework
by bringing the standards together in one place, and has also had an impact
on the development of human rights law more generally.367
Practically speaking, the specifics of self-determination will be
worked out on a case-by-case basis at national, regional and local levels.
The simple definition of self-determination advocated in this article helps
facilitate that task. A flexible interpretation of the right to participation and
the continuum of options for its expression, and a commitment by the state
to genuine freedom from discrimination, will mean that enjoyment of these
two rights together is sufficient to guarantee empowerment and selfdetermination as required by UNDRIP. It will require good faith
negotiations between indigenous representatives and states to define the
exact parameters of the exercise of the right alongside other peoples in each
case.368 Litigation will also undoubtedly play a central role.369
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Lessons from Australia

In the second part of the article, the NT Intervention came under
scrutiny as a controversial example of domestic efforts to address indigenous
disadvantage that arose the year UNDRIP was adopted by the G.A. The
interpretation of self-determination developed in the first part of the article
was applied as the normative criteria for examining Australia’s NTER
methodology in light of evolving international norms. Questions of legal
obligation aside, it is clear that Australia’s treatment of its indigenous
peoples in NT was a denial of self-determination, as it persisted in
“criminalising poverty”370 while applying paternalistic methods that denied
indigenous peoples the opportunity for genuine engagement in conditions of
equality. NTER as a whole, and the compulsory income management
regime in particular, violated the well-established prohibition on racial
discrimination, did not amount to special measures, and fell well short of the
enhanced standards of internal participation under UNDRIP.
Australia claimed that the Intervention represented a radical new
strategy for the protection of indigenous Australians’ rights. 371
Unfortunately, any positive effects of the “stabilisation” and “normalisation”
phases of NTER were ambiguous at best,372 and certainly not attributable to
the decision to proceed in a racially discriminatory manner without any
attempt at consultation; by contrast, the negative effects of Australia’s
approach have been significant. 373 Rather than a new approach, history
seemed to be repeating itself in Australia, 374 with Aboriginal rights
protections taking a step backwards despite the progress being made at the
international level.
The point of this article has not been simply to condemn the
discriminatory and paternalistic aspects of NTER as an obvious example of
how not to proceed, however. Its contribution is to serve as a warning and a
plea, that the same mistakes must not be continued as Australia leaves NTER
behind and transitions to the new Stronger Futures. With the legislative
370
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package replacing NTER having just been passed, Australia must not lose
this opportunity to turn self-determination into something more than a
distant memory of a failed experiment in Australian indigenous policy.375
Self-determination must be given a chance.376
The bottom line is that the socio-economic problems in NT will never
be solved without genuine empowerment, and commitment to an ongoing
partnership: “[y]ou cannot drive change into a community and unload it off
the back of a truck.”377 Australia must make concerted efforts to show that
its endorsement of UNDRIP in 2009, and the national apology,378 were more
than mere political gestures, and to demonstrate a commitment to doing
what works in the long term. As Little Children Are Sacred said, the
problems in Aboriginal communities are not new, and the answers are
obvious–“everybody knows the problems and solutions.”379 Australia has all
the tools it needs to implement the standards of non-discrimination,
participation and self-determination in UNDRIP. It is a matter of political
will as to whether all the advice is acted upon.
Current steps towards constitutional amendment, 380 options for
increasing indigenous political representation, 381 and the long-awaited
establishment of a national indigenous representative body 382 all have
375
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potential to strengthen human rights protection for Aboriginal Australians,
and to help bring Australia into line with the emerging norms of
international law under UNDRIP. But with suggestions in 2011 that a
“second Intervention” might be contemplated to address spiralling crime in
Alice Springs, 383 the importance of engagement and learning from past
mistakes cannot be overstated. The idea of a second Intervention does not
seem to have taken hold as such, but numerous people have expressed the
view that the Stronger Futures legislation amounts to just that–“it is using a
different name, but the formula is the same”384–with Australia choosing to
retain and extend various objectionable features of the Intervention in its
new legislation despite serious opposition. From the early indications it
could not be said that Stronger Futures facilitates indigenous selfdetermination in NT, and it seems likely that the new legislation will be
challenged.
C.

Broader Implications

Of more general relevance internationally, NTER analysis shows that
measuring a state’s compliance against established international standards of
non-discrimination and participation may in some cases be enough to assess
whether the goal of indigenous self-determination is being achieved.385 This
has the potential to open up avenues for redress that might otherwise be
denied because the state refuses to recognize a legal obligation in respect of
self-determination itself. Although the question of remedies is beyond the
scope of this article, it is worth noting that states like Australia do not help
themselves by inhibiting the substantive self-determination of their
indigenous peoples, because that is when contentious issues of remedial selfdetermination arise.386 UNDRIP itself contains numerous provisions on the
right to redress that will become increasingly important as the indigenous
rights framework develops.387
It goes without saying that implementing UNDRIP is the next
significant challenge for advancing indigenous rights, in Australia and
around the world. It will not be easy, and it will not happen quickly.
Peoples, http://nationalcongress.com.au/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2013). It is hoped that the National Congress
will have more success than the ill-fated Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, which was
abolished in 2005.
383
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Changes to the status quo need to take account of the combined legal and
political nature of the issues involved. 388 More generally, states must
recognize that increased partnership with indigenous peoples will only
strengthen and serve democracy and stability within their territories, not
undermine it. 389 Indigenous self-determination should not be seen as an
unachievable dream, or a mere “indulgent fantasy.” 390 The immense
political complexities involved will not dissolve overnight, and UNDRIP
does not yet have legally binding status, but it must be seen as providing
significant impetus for what Daes calls “belated state-building.”391 Models
for success already exist, 392 and the literature is full of suggestions for
implementation.393 Indeed, there are sure signs that UNDRIP is starting to
have some impact.394 Indigenous peoples themselves will and must play a
central role in the ongoing development of their rights framework, and
through UNPFII, they now have a permanent voice at a high level of the
UN. The adoption of UNDRIP was the culmination of a long struggle, but it
is just the beginning of indigenous re-empowerment.
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